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BULLSHITTING THE PEOPLE: THE CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE IMPLICATIONS OF A
SCATALOGICAL TERM
by Andrew E. Taslitz*
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I. INTRODUCTION: WHAT IS “POLITICAL BULLSHIT”?
A. What Is “Political Bullshit”?
When I was a child, my mother, in a time-honored ritual, would wash out
my mouth with soap if I used a vulgar phrase. The washing would be
especially vigorous if the vulgarities were directed at a family member. As a
teenager, the one vulgar word that came most easily to my lips, and thus most
readily provoked my mom’s ire, was “bullshit”—B.S. for short.
Today, however, philosophers, rhetoricians, and social scientists have
embraced the concepts embodied in the word bullshit as central to
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understanding the social world.1 Most recently prompted by the publication
of philosophy professor Harry Frankfurt’s New York Times bestselling books
list entry, On Bullshit —an unusual accomplishment for a serious work of
philosophy—a “bullshit studies” industry has evolved.2 The teachings of this
new field of studies seem especially appropriate for this symposium; for when
the state through its criminal justice agents, usually the police, tries to get
citizens “voluntarily” to permit investigative techniques such as searches,
seizures, and interrogations, the state engages in a classic act of political
bullshitting.3
Bullshitting is a close cousin to lying. A liar consciously speaks untruths.
But a bullshitter may combine lies, truths, half-truths, and irrelevancies in
infinite combinations to hide some particularly important truth from the
listener’s observation.4 When the bullshitter cannot hide the truth, the
bullshitter will distort it or compromise the bullshittee’s ability to critique it.5
1. See generally BULLSHIT AND PHILOSOPHY (Gary L. Hardcastle & George A. Reisch eds., 2006)
(collecting articles on bullshit authored by philosophers, economists, political scientists, sociologists, and
linguists).
2. See HARRY G. FRANKFURT, ON BULLSHIT (2005); George A. Reisch & Gary Hardcastle, On
Bullshitmania, in BULLSHIT AND PHILOSOPHY, supra note 1, at vii, vii-viii (“No other work by a living
academic philosopher has been so well received. After twenty-six weeks on The New York Times bestseller
list, On Bullshit is poised to sell more copies than any commercial philosophy book, ever.”). A quick
Westlaw search for law review articles and texts containing some reference to bullshit yielded 500 such
documents as of February 20, 2007. A similar search on that same date on Amazon.com yielded 26,896
books and articles with such references, many of them with the word “bullshit” in the title and several of
them using the word as an organizing intellectual concept. See, e.g., GRAHAM EDMONDS, THE BUSINESS
OF BULLSHIT (2006); SABRINA LAMB, KEEPIN’ IT REAL: THE RISE OF BULLSHIT IN THE BLACK COMMUNITY
(2006); RON SCHALOW, BULLSHIT ARTIST: THE 9/11 LEADERSHIP MYTH (2006).
3. See infra Part II.
4. See, e.g., George A. Reisch, The Pragmatics of Bullshit, Intelligently Designed, in BULLSHIT
AND PHILOSOPHY, supra note 1, at 33, 38 (defining bullshit). Reisch explains:
[B]ullshitters conceal not some indifference to truth but instead a commitment to other truths
and, usually, an agenda or enterprise that they take to be inspired or justified by those other
truths. For many possible reasons, however, they do not want us to see these truths to which
they are committed. Our knowledge of these other truths, the bullshitter may fear, will prove
embarrassing or damaging to them or their cause. Or it may render their claims less persuasive
and less effective. In some cases, revealing these truths would show that their project is in fact
illegal or . . . unconstitutional.
Id. at 38. Reisch’s definition is not quite the same as Frankfurt’s, who sees bullshitters as indifferent to the
truth, thus constituting “a greater enemy of the truth than lies are.” FRANKFURT, supra note 2, at 60-61; see
also Sara Bernal, Bullshit and Personality, in BULLSHIT AND PHILOSOPHY, supra note1, at 63, 64 (“Frankfurt
claims that an ‘indifference to how things really are’ is of the essence of bullshit. Bullshitters say whatever
they need to say to achieve a certain purpose, without regard for the truth of what they say.”). Philosophers,
as is their wont, indeed vigorously debate the true meaning of bullshit. See generally BULLSHIT AND
PHILOSOPHY, supra note 1. These differences might matter at the margin but, for purposes of this Article,
they are little more than differences in emphasis. This Article’s definition captures the core commonalities
among the proposed definitions in the philosophical debates and is, in any event, most useful here. Other
definitions would not fundamentally alter this analysis. The key is a willingness to do what it takes, whether
silence on a topic or talking about it, whether speaking truths, or lies, or a combination, in order to achieve
a goal that realization would be frustrated by the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
5. See, e.g., Kenneth A. Taylor, Bullshit and the Foibles of the Human Mind, or: What the Masters
of the Dark Arts Know, in BULLSHIT AND PHILOSOPHY, supra note 1, at 49 (“Public discourse in our times
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The bullshitter acts with the goal not simply of hiding or muting the truth but
also of using these tactics to alter the listener’s behavior in some way that
enhances the bullshitter’s material, social, psychological, political, or
economic status.6 Moreover, the bullshitter may act with varying levels of
awareness of what he is doing, sometimes suppressing, or even being entirely
consciously unaware of, his troubling dance with factuality.7
A classic but mundane example of bullshitting is the student who has
done little research or thinking about a paper topic, who then frantically rushes
at the last minute to craft a paper consisting of a wall of verbiage. The student
hopes thereby to give the appearance of great effort, thus perhaps prodding the
professor to give the student a good, or at least a decent, albeit undeserved,
grade.8 The student’s “bullshit is contained not in any single assertion within
her essay,” explains Professor Sara Bernal, but “rather by things like a
pompous tone, a reluctance to get to the point, and general windiness.”9 If she
fails to receive a respectable grade, she may rail at the teacher’s unfairness, all
the while at least knowing deep down that she in fact got precisely what she
earned.10
“Political bullshit,” as defined here, is bullshit done by the State. Such
bullshit is also political in that it affects the distribution of power and other
social resources among individuals and salient social groups.11 Like the

. . . . contains a depressing stew of bullshit, propaganda, spin, and outright lies. . . . Those who seek to
distract, manipulate, scam or mislead have full and easy access to the instruments of mass representation,
. . . while those who aim merely to speak the truth . . . struggle to be heard.”); id. at 51-59 (summarizing
cognitive processes and circumstances making us susceptible to bullshit); infra text accompanying notes
23-40 (discussing tactics for weakening human resistance to bullshit’s pernicious effects).
6. See, e.g., Vanessa Neumann, Political Bullshit and the Stoic Story of Self, in BULLSHIT AND
PHILOSOPHY, supra note 1, at 203, 205 (“The first typical purpose of political bullshit is to depict the speaker
as someone different (‘better,’ given the circumstances) than she is.”). Neumann continues, “Bullshit is the
main tool for the ultimately unconstrained struggle for the flexible and malleable rules of political power.”
Id. at 207; see also Andrew E. Taslitz, Condemning the Racist Personality: Why the Critics of Hate Crimes
Legislation Are Wrong, 40 B.C. L. REV. 739, 758-65 (1999) (summarizing the processes by which language
and other symbolic conduct is used to wage war over individual and group status, status being a good in
itself and a means for gathering material and other social resources).
7. See Bernal, supra note 4, at 64. Bernal explains:
[I]n the typical case, the bullshitter is strongly connected to the truth via a desire to obscure a
specific part of it. This desire may be more or less conscious. The bullshitter may have that part
of the truth in mind clearly or fuzzily, or it may be in some mental compartment to which she
has no immediate conscious access.
Id. at 64.
8. See id.
9. Id. at 65.
10. See id. at 64 (arguing that the student writing a bullshit essay either consciously “knows that
she has nothing thoughtful or deep to say . . . but who aims to prevent her instructor from realizing all this”
or at least knows this deep down so that she is ultimately “not surprised if her ruse fails and her grade is
poor.”).
11. See Mark Evans, The Republic of Bullshit: On the Dumbing-Up of Democracy, in BULLSHIT
AND PHILOSOPHY, supra note 1, at 185 (“It is the most popularly received wisdom about politics that
politicians and others close to the exercise of power—media commentators, lobbyists, and suchlike—are
inordinately disposed to pollute the polity with bullshit.”); see also infra text accompanying notes 185-232
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ordinary bullshitter, the political bullshitter generally proceeds in one of two
broad ways, either by indirectly implicating a falsehood without actually
stating it or by simply distracting the listener from seeing the truth.12
Political advertising techniques illustrate the first, indirect-implication
approach. If a liberal pacifist runs for office, for example, he might appear in
a television advertisement with military officers and the screen subtitled “Vote
Johnson and vote for real national security.”13 It does not matter whether
Johnson’s pacifism is a good or bad thing, which is something about which
many voters will disagree. Either way, the ad is an act of political bullshit
because it conveys the impression to at least some viewers that Johnson
supports a strong military when his views are quite the opposite. Of course,
Johnson never says he wants to beef up the military. He only indirectly
implies it, and he does so in a way that enables him, if called on it, to deny
duplicitous intentions with a straight face. After all, he would say, a smaller
and less bellicose military will raise America’s standing among the
international community. That will truly make us safer.
But this is why the ad is bullshit rather than a lie. Johnson may even
believe his own protestations of innocent intentions, yet the ad still fairly
implies to some a false message—though surely a message that helps to
advance Johnson’s political career. Note, however, that the degree of
Johnson’s success as a bullshitter importantly turns on his bullshittee’s
ignorance. Viewers who rarely read newspapers other than the sports section
and who listen to the evening news as background while eating dinner will not
know Johnson’s true views in any depth. Accordingly, they will be less likely
to spot that they are being bullshitted.14
Liberals, and increasingly, skeptics elsewhere on the political spectrum
often accuse President Bush of the second type of bullshitting: distracting
listeners from the truth. One liberal thinker declares that Bush used dubious
intelligence reports about Iraqi efforts to obtain yellow cake uranium and
unsubstantiated suggestions connecting Saddam Hussein to September 11 as
red herrings, thus drawing the electorate’s vision away from the real truth —
that the Bush Administration’s members “had an antecedent intention, and
perhaps something like a plan, to invade Iraq no matter what.”15 Though
conservatives will surely take umbrage at this description, if it is true, it is a
(explaining processes by which political bullshit affects the distribution of power resources among
individuals and groups).
12. See Bernal, supra note 4, at 65.
13. See, e.g., ANTHONY PRATKANIS & ELIOT ARONSON, AGE OF PROPAGANDA: THE EVERYDAY USE
AND ABUSE OF PERSUASION 115-57 (1992) (analyzing techniques of what this Article calls “political
bullshit”); PHILIP M. TAYLOR, MUNITIONS OF THE MIND: A HISTORY OF PROPAGANDA (2003) (analyzing
similar techniques); Taylor, supra note 5, at 49 (noting the similarity between commercial advertising
techniques and political bullshit). The Johnson advertisement example is the author’s creation.
14. See infra Part I.B (discussing the work of writers in a variety of fields that recognizes the role
of ignorance in prompting the effectiveness of political bullshit).
15. See Bernal, supra note 4, at 65-66.
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quintessential example of bullshitting by distraction. Once again, its success
depends in part on the audience’s ignorance. Informed political junkies who
closely followed the Bush Administration’s statements about Iraq and the
newspapers’ leaking of internal Administration deliberations on the subject
before September 11 would have had ample information to enable them to be
among the strongest critics of Bush’s early case for the war in Iraq, and they
were.16
When police fail to inform suspects of their constitutional rights, they
hope to play on citizen ignorance as a way to encourage citizen cooperation.17
Police officers may rarely directly lie to a citizen. Thus, for example, police
who ask a passenger on a bus to open his backpack for inspection for illegal
drugs may rarely, if ever, flatly and falsely declare that he has no right to
refuse.18 Yet, like the political advertisement example, the police may subtly

16. See, e.g., Dana Priest & Joby Warrick, Observers: Evidence for War Lacking, WASH. POST,
Sept. 13, 2002, at A30.
17. See, e.g., United States v. Drayton, 536 U .S. 194, 206 (2002) (rejecting “the suggestion that
police officers must always inform citizens of their right to refuse when seeking permission to conduct a
warrantless consent search”); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 243 (1973) (finding that a consentto-search can be voluntary under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution even if citizens
are not informed of, or even know of, their right to refuse given that “the community has a real interest in
encouraging consent, for the resulting search may yield necessary evidence for the solution and prosecution
of crime”); DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM (1999) (describing police tactics in obtaining “consensual” searches as “rel[ying] on ignorance and
thinly veiled coercion”).
18. See, e.g., Drayton, 536 U.S. at 194 (holding that obtaining consent to search bus passengers
without informing them of their Fourth Amendment rights did not involve lying about authority to refuse).
Indeed, outright lies about police authority to conduct a search may invalidate any consent, though
bullshitting to take advantage of citizen ignorance rarely will. See ANDREW E. TASLITZ & MARGARET L.
PARIS, CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 409 (2d ed. 2003); see also supra note 17. Justice Souter,
joined by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg in the Drayton case, in which the majority held that a bus
passenger’s consent to search in the drug interdiction context was voluntary despite the lack of rights
warnings, essentially concluded that both the officers’ efforts to obtain voluntary consent and the majority’s
conclusion that they had done so were classic instances of bullshit. Drayton, 536 U.S. at 211-12 (Souter,
J., dissenting). Justice Souter said:
[F]or reasons unexplained, the driver with the tickets entitling the passengers to travel had
yielded his custody of the bus and its seated travelers to three police officers, whose authority
apparently superseded the driver’s own. The officers took control of the entire passenger
compartment, one stationed at the door keeping surveillance of all the occupants, the others
working forward from the back. With one officer right behind him and the other one forward,
a third officer accosted each passenger at quarters extremely close and so cramped that as many
as half the passengers could not even have stood to face the speaker. None was asked whether
he was willing to converse with the police or to take part in the enquiry. Instead, the officer said
the police were “conducting bus interdiction,” in the course of which they “would like . . .
cooperation.” The reasonable inference was that the “interdiction” was not a consensual
exercise, but one the police would carry out whatever the circumstances; that they would prefer
“cooperation” but would not let the lack of it stand in their way. There was no contrary
indication that day, since no passenger had refused the cooperation requested, and there was no
reason for any passenger to believe that the driver would return and the trip resume until the
police were satisfied. The scene was set and an atmosphere of obligatory participation was
established by this introduction. Later requests to search prefaced with “Do you mind . . .”
would naturally have been understood in the terms with which the encounter began.
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convey just that message in their overbearing body language, command tone
of voice, and attitude of expected obedience.19 Similarly, an officer who has
given Miranda warnings—supposedly curing citizen ignorance—may deliver
them quickly, in a monotone voice, followed readily by launching into a
description (perhaps some of it accurate, some of it not) of the evidence
against the suspect and the horrific punishments awaiting him if he fails to
cooperate.20 Such tactics are an effort to distract the interrogatee from focusing
on, or fully understanding, his rights, while simultaneously sending the
indirect message that they are mere paper rights that the police have no
intention to truly honor.21 Thus, the police bullshit by distraction to obtain a
confession.22
B. Why Does Bullshit Work?
Why does bullshit work? Although this Article is not intended to focus
on this question, a brief answer to it helps in understanding bullshit’s
advantages and disadvantages for a democratic society.
Ignorance, as already mentioned, improves the prospects of bullshit’s
success by denying the bullshittee the tools needed to spot deception.23 A
speaker of bullshit may also be only semi-consciously or even unconsciously
aware that his words mislead.24 Self-deceiving bullshitters—those who
therefore in part bullshits themselves—save themselves the pangs of an

Id. (citation omitted).
In other words, although the officers used misleading words like “cooperation,” occasionally adopted
a soft tone of voice, phrased their commands in the form of a question, and never overtly lied about their
authority, they also never revealed its limitations and created an atmosphere sending the tacit message that
none existed. See id. This combination of omissions, misdirection, and fear was designed to give the police
what they wanted—evidence of illegal drug use—thus constituting quintessential bullshit. See id. As Souter
later explained, “A police officer who is certain to get his way has no need to shout.” Id. at 212. Indeed,
concerns like these likely underlaid the now overruled position of the court of appeals that a positive
indication of a right to refuse was required. Id. at 206.
19. See, e.g., TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note 18, at 408 (cataloguing police behaviors such as tone
of voice, intimidating physical presence, and visible display of weapons that are relevant to a determination
of the voluntariness of consent, but none of which alone or even in combination necessarily invalidate it).
Compare the Court’s current willingness to take advantage of citizen ignorance in the consent search area
with its earlier statement in another context that “no system of criminal justice can, or should, survive if it
comes to depend for its continued effectiveness on the citizens’ abdication through unawareness of their
constitutional rights.” Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490 (1964).
20. See TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note 18, at 641-42 (summarizing the literature on this point).
21. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Book Review, 17 CRIM. JUST. 57 (Winter 2002) (reviewing WELSH S.
WHITE, MIRANDA’S WANING PROTECTIONS: POLICE INTERROGATION PRACTICES AFTER DICKERSON (2001)
and discussing that function of police tactics designed to minimize Miranda’s impact); cf. Robert M.
Mosteller, Police Deception Before Miranda Warnings: The Case for Per Se Exclusion of an Entirely
Unjustified Practice at a Particularly Sensitive Moment, 39 TEXAS TECH. L. REV. ____, ____ (discussing
pre-warning police deception designed to obtain post-warning Miranda waivers).
22. See Taslitz, supra note 21, at 57.
23. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
24. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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anguished conscience and appears sincere, for that is indeed a more or less
accurate description of their conscious state of mind.25 Those who seem
sincere also seem more credible and likable, magnifying their power to
effectively deceive.26
Bullshit also alters the costs and benefits of the economy of attention.27
In normal times, everyone has busy days, focusing on work, family, health,
perhaps church, and a small bit of leisure time. People have only so much
energy, time, and effort to expend in choosing the objects, duration, and
intensity of their attention. The distracting powers of bullshit and its easy and
pervasive availability work to occupy much of people’s limited attention.28 In
turn, people have few reserves left to gather the information and develop the
skills necessary to wade through bullshit’s seas.29
Bullshit also works to appeal to our emotions as well as our intellect.30
Some emotions aid careful thought, but others retard it.31 Bullshit plays on the
latter emotions, such as fear or resentment, engaging the listener’s attention in
powerful ways that still internal deliberation.32 Both the liberal pacifist
politician Johnson, whose ads falsely conveyed military strength, and

25. See Bernal, supra note 4, at 82 (“But generally speaking, it is easier to make a habit of
bullshitting than of lying, because outright deception ordinarily provokes a sting of conscience. When
bullshitting is less than fully conscious, this sting is less than fully sharp, and is therefore a weaker
deterrent.”).
26. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Willfully Blinded: On Date Rape and Self-Deception, 28 HARV. J.L. &
GENDER 381, 420-21 (2005) (summarizing social science research on the advantages of self-deception for
effectively deceiving others); Par Anders Granhag Aldhert Vrig, Deception Detection, in PSYCHOLOGY AND
LAW: AN EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVE 43, 65 (Neil Brewer & Kipling D. Williams eds., 2005) (“[L]ie catchers
who attributed positive trait characteristics (dispositional) to the person they were judging also tended to
judge this person as truthful in a given situation (state).”).
27. See JACOB NEEDLEMAN, WHY CAN’T WE BE GOOD? 110-16, 124-25, 136-42 (2007) (analyzing
the personal and social importance of, and difficulty of, simply truly paying attention to our thoughts and
actions and their impact on the material and social world); ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN, FRUITS OF SORROW:
FRAMING OUR ATTENTION TO SUFFERING 1-14 (1997) (defining and explaining the term “the economy of
attention” and its contribution to human suffering and political injustice).
28. See, e.g., MICHAEL SCHUDSON, THE GOOD CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN CIVIC LIFE 31014 (1998) (noting time pressures of everyday life combine with its increasing complexity to make it hard
for citizens truly to be informed on many issues); Evans, supra note 11, at 196-97 (arguing that politics has
been “dumbed-down” because citizens, “overwhelmed and embarrassed by the complexity of politics,
perhaps jealous of those few who seem more capable of getting to grips with them,” nevertheless feel
compelled to speak on all political subjects, however uninformed their opinions on those topics might be).
29. See, e.g., Evans, supra note 11, at 199-200 (advocating wide citizen training in philosophical
methods to promote more informed and critical thinking in a world of limited information resources);
Taylor, supra note 5, at 61-62 (arguing for the necessity of continuing education to counteract the ignorance
and lazy mental habits that make us more susceptible to the ill effects of political bullshit).
30. See Neumann, supra note 6, at 207-08.
31. See, e.g., Andrew E. Taslitz, Racial Auditors and the Fourth Amendment: Data with the Power
to Inspire Political Action, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 221, 273-84 (2003) (explaining how moderate
anxiety can sometimes improve political deliberation and prompt action, while fear can often do just the
opposite).
32. See Neumann, supra note 6, at 211-12 (analyzing bullshit’s relationship to fear, terror, and
resentment of the “other” and how this relationship injures sound political deliberation).
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President Bush’s efforts to link Saddam Hussein to September 11, for
example, sought to appeal to our fears of assaults on our physical safety,
assaults not just by anyone but by foreigners, aliens, and outsiders.33
Ignorance, self-deception, emotional pull, and limited attention thus combine
to make bullshit a uniquely effective rhetorical tool. In the case of the police,
the high incidences of purportedly voluntary consent searches and of Miranda
waivers arguably suggest that police mastery of bullshit is impressive.34
Yet, in a democracy, bullshit imposes both serious costs and offers
tempting benefits. On the cost side, bullshit promotes citizen ignorance of the
content and meaning of those rights that constitute our republic. If it is some
basic understanding of a uniquely American conception of constitutional rights
that defines us as a nation, as some thinkers argue, then bullshit’s ability to
obscure that understanding alters the very meaning of what it is to be
American.35 Even more than this, bullshit places each individual into a fantasy
world rather than a real one. Decisions therefore result from illusion, a kind
of craziness far from the autonomy and equal respect for individual rationality
that democracy assumes.36 Correlatively, bullshit prevents informed individual
and group deliberation, both of which are essential to a well-functioning
republic.37 Moreover, by obscuring truth and appealing to base emotions,
bullshit can encourage “them-us thinking” that entrenches class and racial
inequality with society’s oppressed being most likely to suffer bullshit’s
indignities.38 Society’s elites, in turn, benefit from the self-delusion and selfjustification for oppression that bullshit provides.39 The task of Part II is to

33. See id. at 212; COREY ROBIN, FEAR: THE HISTORY OF A POLITICAL IDEA 18-19, 23, 162-65, 18498 (2004) (discussing how political fear generally, and that of terrorism specifically, can unite “us” against
“them” while stifling dissent and empowering political elites); PETER N. STEARNS, AMERICAN FEAR: THE
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF HIGH ANXIETY 21-52 (2006) (tracing how the American style of political
fear affected public policy in the wake of September 11); infra Part II.C (discussing bullshit and fear of the
outsider).
34. See infra text accompanying notes 287-95 (discussing the high incidence of consent searches);
TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note 18, at 644 (summarizing data on the high incidence of Miranda waivers).
35. See infra Part II.A.4. See generally JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME: A THEORY OF
CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 54-58, 183-84 (2001) (defining democratic constitutionalism as a
people’s struggle over time to craft and live out its fundamental commitments made under its unique shared
legal and political order).
36. See infra text accompanying notes 56-67 (analyzing bullshit and craziness).
37. See infra Part II.B.
38. See infra Part II.C.
39. See Neumann, supra note 6, at 206-07, 210-12; Taslitz, supra note 26, at 394-98, 413-23
(explaining how self-deception enables elites to consolidate power while consciously believing that they
are adhering to purported egalitarian norms); infra Part II.C (analyzing processes by which political bullshit
promotes them/us thinking and is differentially spread among, and harms, minority communities). Neumann
notes:
[U]s-versus-them feeling is reinforced by the imagery of waging a war, which conjures visceral
reactions of patriotism (possibly jingoism) and a call to violent and unquestioning action. If we
are at war, then we must join our compatriots—and fight without questioning our orders. This
is very useful for those seeking extra powers and a curb on civil liberties in order to wage this
war.
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explore each of these social costs of bullshit —the destruction of self, collapse
of deliberation, and balkanization of political society.40
Political bullshit in the criminal justice system, however, purportedly
offers one great benefit. It aids in convicting the guilty, thus promoting both
a just and safe society.41 This is no small benefit, and Part III of this Article
takes a first cut at exploring the size of this benefit and whether its attainability
is feasible in less deceptive ways.42 On balance, Part III finds that the social
costs of police bullshitting citizens in the criminal justice system usually
outweigh its benefits.43 Nevertheless, as Part IV explains, merely informing
citizens of their rights is a necessary, but not sufficient, step toward
minimizing political bullshit’s ill effects.44 Cognitive awareness of the content
of rights is worth little absent the tacit knowledge that comes from frequent
exercise and defense of rights in a critical fashion. Accordingly, Part IV
argues, relatively cheap but widespread social changes in how we educate
citizens about their constitutional rights, from cradle to grave, is ultimately
required.45 Part IV offers a few, hopefully practical, suggestions for
improvement.46 Finally, Part V summarizes the arguments and conclusions in
an effort to ensure that this Article does not inadvertently bullshit the reader.47
II. THE COSTS OF POLITICAL BULLSHIT
Political bullshit imposes important costs on individuals, groups, and the
polity as a whole. More specifically, political bullshit that relies on citizen
ignorance or misunderstanding of constitutional rights in the criminal justice
system expresses disrespect for individuals; severs the bonds of peoplehood,
especially those linking racial and ethnic minorities to the broader political
system; distorts individual identity and rationality; and hampers the quality of
public deliberation. That bullshit causes these ill effects can be seen more

Id.
40. See infra Part II.
41. See, e.g., U.S. v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 205-07 (2002) (justifying deceptive consent-to-search
techniques, including maintaining ignorance about constitutional rights, on crime-fighting grounds); Allison
D. Redlich et al., The Police Interrogation of Children and Adolescents, in INTERROGATIONS, CONFESSIONS,
AND ENTRAPMENT 107, 109 (G. Daniel Lassiter ed., 2004) (arguing that under current law, police “are
allowed to use ‘trickery and deception’ (e.g., telling suspects they have an eyewitness or fingerprints on the
weapon when they do not) to obtain statements of guilt”); CHARLES L. YESCHKE, INTERROGATION:
ACHIEVING CONFESSIONS USING PERMISSIBLE PERSUASION 12 (2004) (counseling interrogators that
“trickery and deception are morally acceptable in the law enforcement context,” within limits and that
“manipulat[ing] vulnerable culpable subjects” does not significantly cause false confessions).
42. See infra Part III.
43. See infra Part III.
44. See infra Part IV.
45. See infra Part IV.
46. See infra Part IV.
47. See infra Part V.
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clearly by first defining just what we mean by “respect” and its opposite,
“disrespect.”

A. Dis-integration of the Rational Self
1. Defining Respect
Some variant of the idea of equal respect for all citizens is at the heart of
most modern democratic theories.48 Human rights theorists go further,
demanding equal respect for all human beings.49 Such theories are based on
the assumption that all citizens, or all persons, are in some way alike, therefore
sharing the same status and thus requiring the state to give them equal
treatment befitting of that status.50 Commentators debate what attribute of
sameness all persons share. Some think that it is being made in “the image of
God,” others that it is the capacity to achieve moral goodness, and still others-the Kantians—that it is rationality and autonomy—humans’ nature as selfdirecting beings legislating their own life plans.51
This last vision, the one of rational autonomy, is most frequently
embraced in some form by American courts and commentators and most
clearly helps to examine the relationship between the state’s bullshitting its
citizens and the disintegration of their political selves.52 Yet the other
conceptions would lead to the same conclusion, for all share an understanding
of equality that requires well-informed persons making reasoned choices.
Moreover, all these conceptions entail as a corollary that whatever the quality
that we all share, that quality entails certain rights and entitlements without
which our status as citizens or humans respectively is ignored.53 Freedom of
conscience, privacy, the right to own property earned by the sweat of our
brow, and freedom of movement are among the rights commonly deemed to

48. See generally KENNETH KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE
CONSTITUTION (1991) (discussing how equal citizenship has long served America as a unifying goal and
has become a principle of our constitutional law).
49. See, e.g., JOHN E. COONS & PATRICK M. BRENNAN, BY NATURE EQUAL: THE ANATOMY OF A
WESTERN INSIGHT 3-15 (1999) (discussing how all rights in Western political thought are justified by appeal
to an idea of a “distinctive existent” quality shared in equal measure by all humans); Andrew E. Taslitz,
Stories of Fourth Amendment Disrespect: From Elian to the Internment, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 2257, 227684 (2002) (defining “respect” and its legal significance).
50. See COONS & BRENNAN, supra note 42, at 3-15.
51. See id. at 13, 116-22 (summarizing and contrasting Kantian theory and an alternative focusing
on the capacity to achieve moral goodness); MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE IDEA OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FOUR
INQUIRIES 11-41 (1998) (arguing that the idea of human rights is “ineliminably religious”); WILLIAM F.
SCHULTZ, IN OUR OWN BEST INTEREST: HOW DEFENDING HUMAN RIGHTS BENEFITS US ALL 17-37 (2001)
(offering pragmatic arguments for accepting the ideas of human rights and equality).
52. See COONS & BRENNAN, supra note 42, at 3-15.
53. See Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution, 39
UCLA L. REV. 1659, 1697 (1992).
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belong to all people simply by nature of their citizenship or humanity.54
Respect for individuals in these and other ways thus requires treating them
“fittingly,” that is, in accordance with their status on some specified trait,
generally meaning their possession of rational autonomy.55
But what does it mean to treat someone fittingly? Beyond according to
citizens equality of the rights just catalogued that help to define them as
citizens fully belonging to the body politic and treating them as the rational
creature that a democratic republican system assumes, many fittingness
theorists agree that respect necessarily implies diversity in life choices.56 Such
diversity stems from the belief that each person is in some sense unique, thus
of infinite worth.57 Social psychologists have indeed found strong evidence
that there is a human drive toward uniqueness.58 That drive prods us to work
toward standing out in some ways as different from others, though we also
strive in other ways to be much like them.59 If each individual’s unique
choices and goals are not treated as equally worthy, then it is hard to see how
equal respect is being shown for that person as a rational being meriting
autonomy in the individual’s thoughts and actions.60 A sense of individual
uniqueness is thus an important part of our sense of self, of who we are.
Respect must therefore be shown for the sorts of differences that are central to
personal identity.61 In short, people treat others the same in part by honoring
their differences.

54. See, e.g., JOHANNES MORSINK, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: ORIGINS,
DRAFTING, & INTENT 13-56, 73-75 (1999) (recognizing privacy, property, and free movement as universal
rights); cf. Martha Minow, Equality and the Bill of Rights, in THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS: HUMAN
DIGNITY AND AMERICAN VALUES (Michael J. Meyer & William A. Parents eds., 1992) (discussing how
human dignity and equality are embraced in the Bill of Rights, especially in the protections of the First
Amendment).
55. See GEOFFREY CUPIT, JUSTICE AS FITTINGNESS 1-2 (1996). Cupit sees respect and justice as
both parts of the fittingness family of concepts, with respect being the broader idea. See id. at 15-28. His
distinctions are subtle and complex but of no moment whatsoever for the arguments made here, so they are
ignored for purposes of this Article.
56. See Jean Hampton, Retribution and the Liberal State, 1994 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 117,
140-41 (defending a “perfectionist liberalism” as one in which the state must promote “value pluralism,”
so that the citizenry has plenty of options and opportunities to choose from in creating its life). Professor
Cupit is responsible for the terminology of “fittingness,” an idea that captures an underlying similarity
among theorists writing about respect, dignity, insult, and humiliation. See CUPIT, supra note 49, at 1-4.
This Article thus refers to them as “fittingness theorists.”
57. See CUPIT, supra note 49, at 65-80 (arguing that justice requires treating individuals both as
unique persons of independent worth and parts of a larger whole); Andrew E. Taslitz, Myself Alone:
Individualizing Justice Through Psychological Character Evidence, 52 MD. L. REV.1, 3-4, 14-30 (1993)
(defining “individualized justice” and its connection to respect for human uniqueness).
58. See generally JUDITH RICH HARRIS, NO TWO ALIKE: HUMAN NATURE AND HUMAN
INDIVIDUALITY (2006) (attempting to solve the mystery of why no two people are alike or why even
identical twins differ in the ways they do).
59. See id. at 228-31, 239-40, 242-43, 247.
60. See Andrew E. Taslitz, The Inadequacies of Civil Society: Law’s Complementary Role in
Regulating Harmful Speech, 1 MD. L. J. OF RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 306, 324-30, 338-39 (2001).
61. See Taslitz, supra note 6, at 746-65 (1999).
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2. Undermining Rationality
Bullshitting citizens about the existence and nature of their rights is a
fundamental form of disrespect because it is inconsistent with treating them as
rational creatures who are partly defined by equal rights, yet who deserve to
make autonomous choices reflecting their uniqueness as individuals. Lying
to citizens, or distracting them from the truth, is the very opposite of treating
them as rational, autonomous beings. As the father of bullshit studies, Harry
Frankfurt, has put it, “In telling his lie, the liar tries to mislead us into
believing that the facts are other than they actually are. He tries to impose his
will on us. He aims at inducing us to accept his fabrication as an accurate
account of how the world truly is.”62 But the liar’s assertion of his dominance
over his victim does more than overcome the latter’s will. In practical effect,
the liar condemns his listener to an imaginary world.63 Frankfurt elaborates:
Lies are designed to damage our grasp of reality. So they are intended, in a
very real way, to make us crazy. To the extent that we believe them, our
minds are occupied and governed by fictions, fantasies, and illusions that
have been concocted for us by the liar. What we accept as real is a world that
others cannot see, touch or experience in any direct way. . . . [T]he victim of
the lie is . . . shut off from the world of common experience and isolated in
an illusory realm to which there is no path that others might find or follow.64

The victim of the lie is not only exiled to a sort of insanity but to a form
of blindness as well.65 All human interaction involves an effort to read one
another’s minds.66 We rely on language, nonverbal cues, and social context
to divine another’s thoughts as best we can.67 We are surprisingly good at this
task, for it is how we communicate, resolve conflict, negotiate social status,

62. HARRY FRANKFURT, ON TRUTH 77 (2006). Although Frankfurt’s new book is called On Truth,
it is less about truth versus lies than it is a companion to his work about bullshit. See id. at 3-6. For
Frankfurt, bullshit cannot be understood without knowing the meaning and moral importance of truth.
63. See id. at 77-78.
64. Id. at 78-79.
65. See id.
66. See, e.g., DAVID LIVINGSTONE SMITH, WHY WE LIE: THE EVOLUTIONARY ROOTS OF DECEPTION
AND THE UNCONSCIOUS MIND 34-35, 65-71 (2004). This human ability to mind-read is probably just a more
refined version of a skill common to many social creatures. See, e.g., J.R. Krebs & R. Dawkins, Animal
Signals: Mind-reading and Manipulation, in BEHAVIORAL ECOLOGY: AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH 385
(J.R. Krebs & N.B. Davies eds., 1984) (noting that for an animal that has any kind of social life, or that is
a predator or preyed upon, some skill is required at reading the internal motivational state and probable
future behavior of other animals—rivals, mates, parents, offspring, predators, parasites, and hosts).
67. See SMITH, supra note 61, at 65-71. Anthropologist Robin Dunbar argues that the need for
effective social communication was indeed the primary evolutionary force promoting human intelligence.
See ROBIN DUNBAR, GROOMING, GOSSIP, AND THE EVOLUTION OF LANGUAGE 65 (1998).
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and bond with others.68 For this reason, respect in social relationships, though
involving reticence in invading another’s privacy, also includes an expectation
that, on the subjects about which that other person has agreed to speak, that
person will allow at least a modest degree of intimacy: “the intimacy that
consists in knowing what is on, or what is in, another person’s mind.”69 As
one author put it, “The liar refuses to permit himself, to the extent that he lies,
to be known. This is an insult to his victims. It naturally injures their pride.”70
Like the autistic child, the victim is rendered at least partially and temporarily
mind-blind.71 Someone rendered mind-blind about others’ intentions regarding
when and how he may exercise his rights, and about the content of his rights,
cannot fairly be said to be treated equally with the sighted.72
3. Distorting Unique Individual Identity
Bullshit not only undermines rationality but also the sense of individual
human uniqueness.73 Our sense of uniqueness necessarily implies some
understanding of our separateness from others, our distinctions from them.74

68. See DUNBAR, supra note 62, at 65; SMITH, supra note 61, at 65-71.
69. FRANKFURT, supra note 57, at 80; see Andrew E. Taslitz, The Fourth Amendment in the TwentyFirst Century: Technology, Privacy, and Human Emotions, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125, 150-80
(2002) (explaining that privacy is needed precisely to obtain necessary respite from the mind-reading and
judging of others whom, we fear, will draw unfair conclusions not so much about our likely current behavior
as about our overall character and worth based upon incomplete information).
70. FRANKFURT, supra note 57, at 80.
71. See, e.g., TEMPLE GRANDIN & SEAN BARRON, THE UNWRITTEN RULES OF SOCIAL
RELATIONSHIPS (2005) (describing how autistic children and adults understand and experience the social
world very differently than most people, an experience fitting the description of “mind-blindness”); TEMPLE
GRANDIN, THINKING IN PICTURES: MY LIFE WITH AUTISM (exp. ed. 2006) (describing Grandin’s own
autism).
72. See SMITH, supra note 61, at 65-78. Indeed, David Smith describes an evolutionary arms race
in which, precisely because of the human ability to mind-read, other humans seek to develop new skills of
deception. See id. In turn, evolution pushed us toward further-improved mind-reading to get past the fog
created by deception, and the development of language and modern culture allows this competition to
continue in a spiral. See id. The arms race metaphor is an apt one, however, for it conjures images of
enemies competing to be better able to obliterate one another. See id. Deception is the Evil Empire in this
vision, understood as an effort to manipulate and exploit a more vulnerable opponent. See id. at 35.
Deception can increase social conflict, warn repeat players not to trust the deceiver, and ultimately lead to
the deceiver being deprived of information that he himself needs to survive and prosper. See id. at 77.
Accordingly, explains Smith, “When we discover that someone is trying to defraud us, our first response
is often a surge of rage.” Id. at 73. Some openness to mind-reading, at least free of substantial deceptive
efforts to prevent it, though varying with the circumstance and type of human relationship, is still taken as
the social norm. See Taslitz, supra note 54, at 355-66. Lies and their near-cousins breach these rules of
engagement, thus eliciting righteous anger stemming from the sense that we have been abused and degraded.
See id. (explaining that retributive feelings stem from the sense that we are being treated as of less worth
than we are and than another, feelings triggered particularly when we believe we are treated by that other
as solely a means to his own ends).
73. Cf. Taslitz, supra note 51, at 1, 3-4, 14-20 (explaining the human need to be thought of as
unique, a “universe of one”).
74. See HARRIS, supra note 52, at 160, 181, 210-11, 228-29.
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This sense of separateness, argue some philosophers and developmental
psychologists, in turn flows from our “coming up against obstacles to the
fulfillment of our intentions,” that is, against aspects of the world that will not
readily submit to our desires because they are independent of us.75 Further
experience with such obstacles and how to handle them teaches us about our
individual strengths, vulnerabilities, and values.76 These lessons help to define
the “specific sort of being that we are.”77 Our individual identity therefore
necessarily develops in comparison to, and contradistinction from, the external
physical and social world.78 As one theorist put it, “It is only through our
recognition of a world of stubbornly independent reality, fact, and truth that
we come both to recognize ourselves as beings distinct from others and to
articulate the specific nature of our own identities.”79 If we base our identity
on a false reality, then our identity is itself rendered false, and certainly if we
learn that we have been duped, we doubt our own sense of self, no longer
trusting who we think we are or what we think the world to be.80 Indeed, most
of us have some sense of a core or true self, aspiring to bring our thoughts and
actions in line with the real us, to “live fully in accord with . . . [our] own
natures.”81 We feel exhilaration when we respond to a challenge in a way that
is consistent with what we see to be our “most authentic nature.”82 In turn, we
despise what pulls us away from this personal authenticity, as famed
philosopher Baruch Spinoza has convincingly argued.83
Imagine an innocent person falsely suspected of using illegal narcotics.84
An officer “asks” that person for permission to search him, never once
mentioning that he has the right to refuse.85 This individual thinks of himself
as a law-abiding person in a relatively just world in which the innocent are
rewarded, the guilty punished, and individual rights respected.86 If he is
unaware of his right to say no, subsequently finding out that he had such a
right, these foundations of his identity will be shaken, though not shattered.87

75. FRANKFURT, supra note 57, at 98-99.
76. Id. at 100.
77. Id.
78. See HARRIS, supra note 52, at 164-65, 173-75, 194-97, 210-13, 228-30.
79. FRANKFURT, supra note 57, at 101.
80. See id. at 47.
81. Id. at 46.
82. Id. at 44; see MIKE W. MARTIN, SELF-DECEPTION AND MORALITY 78 (1986) (explaining that
authentic persons are best understood as those “who shape their self-identities on the basis of . . . concern
for truth”).
83. See FRANKFURT, supra note 57, at 38-48; BARUCH SPINOZA, ETHICS, Part III, Proposition 13,
Scholium (trans. R.H. M. Elwes 1989), available at http://www.worldwideschool.org/library/books/relg/
christiantheology/Ethics/chap11.html.
84. COLLEEN A. WARD, ATTITUDES TOWARD RAPE: FEMINIST AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVES 84-86, 182 (1995) (discussing this “just world” hypothesis, albeit in a different context).
85. See id.
86. See id.
87. See supra notes 59-67 and accompanying text (stating that discovering deception prompts rage
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If he does know of his refusal right, he may interpret an officer’s silence about
it as either an effort to fool the citizen or as an indication of an unwillingness
to respect that citizen’s rights.88 These thoughts may occur at the time of the
requested search or upon later reflection. The thoughts may be fully
consciously articulated or less consciously entertained.89 Either way, the
duped citizen may react with anger, or at least irritation.90 Perhaps a single
incident will not destroy his previous conceptions about police and the rule of
law, but repeated incidents—as are likely common in many poor, inner-city
neighborhoods—will more likely do so.91 If he comes to believe that social
reality is not what he previously believed it to be, he will feel that he has been
living a lie.92 The resulting outrage may prompt him to change who he is, at
least in some modest respects.93 Concerning his law-abiding nature, he may
at least be less willing to cooperate with the police, though perhaps also more
willing to violate minor legal restrictions when he sees little chance of getting
caught.94 If he sees the officer’s actions as, for example, stemming from
stereotypes based on the citizen’s race, ethnicity, or religion rather than based
on his own unique character, words, and actions, the degree of these changes
in law-abiding self-identity may be significantly amplified.95
Would these effects disappear if the citizen were in fact guilty? Perhaps
they would be reduced, but they would hardly vanish. A guilty suspect likely
lacks a self-conception as a law-abiding person. Yet he still thinks of himself
as unique and still wants to be judged for his own character and actions.96 If
he believes he is singled out based upon race, his resentment will be real,
overlaying his fear or anger at simply being caught in the act.97 He may

when we realize another has in effect driven us crazy, awakening us from a fantasy world to find we have
been manipulated and exploited by the deceiver).
88. Cf. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 486, 453-55, 465, 468-69 (1966) (making a similar point in
the context of police interrogation).
89. See Taslitz, supra note 26, at 388-94 (defining and explaining the operations of the unconscious
and semi-conscious minds).
90. See SMITH, supra note 61, at 73 (explaining how deception-discovery prompts anger).
91. See TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC COOPERATION
WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS 57, 162-64 (2002) (noting empirical data supports the conclusions that
“police officers and court officials can gain consent and cooperation from the public by behaving in ways
that are perceived as procedurally fair” and that minority group experiences with police treating them
respectfully or not have a significant impact on perceived procedural fairness). Other influences on lawabidingness are discussed in Part III.
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. See id. at 163; see generally TOM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (rev. ed. 2006)
(extending the argument that procedural justice perceptions play a critical role in encouraging law-abiding
behavior, even among those society has labeled “criminals”).
95. See DAVID A. HARRIS, PROFILES IN INJUSTICE: WHY RACIAL PROFILING CANNOT WORK 94 -144
(2003).
96. Cf. Taslitz, supra note 51, at 1, 3-4, 14-30 (discussing all persons’ need for individualized
justice).
97. See HARRIS, supra note 90, at 94-144.
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further see an officer’s silence about constitutional rights as yet another
indication of poor treatment stemming from his race.98 Police silence becomes
perceived as police lies, which are in turn experienced as insults.99 If, unlike
with the case of the innocent citizen, police bullshitting about constitutional
rights does not in fact alter the guilty suspect’s self-conception, such
bullshitting may nevertheless be understood as treating the suspect as in at
least some ways inconsistent with that self-conception, and that too will
emotionally unsettle the guilty man.100
Every individual of course reacts differently to such situations. Yet ample
social science suggests that these somewhat starkly drawn hypotheticals may
capture much of the truth. Thus procedural justice research reveals that
whether police inform persons of their rights importantly impacts whether they
feel fairly treated, as does individualized justice—treating them for who they
uniquely are and what they uniquely do.101 Furthermore, persons experiencing
a reduced perception of fair treatment are more likely to disobey the law in the
future.102 This vision of officer bullshit as harming individual identity, thus
constituting disrespectful treatment, seems at least one plausible explanation
for how officer deception or misdirection may contribute to these ill
procedural justice effects.
4. Severing Social Bonds
a. Defining Peoplehood
Yet self-identity is not entirely a matter of an isolated individual’s
interactions with the rest of the world. To the contrary, there are important
social aspects of each person’s identity. For example, our group connections—
as a Jew, Christian, or Muslim, a Democrat or Republican, a Kappa or a
Delta—are critical pieces of who we are.103 Likewise, our sense of being part
of the “American people,” as opposed to the German, Russian, Chinese, or
Egyptian people, is part of our individual identities.104 Being part of a people,
however, argues constitutional scholar Jed Rubenfeld, means individuals’ “coexistence, over time, under the rule of a given legal and political order.”105

98. See id.
99. See infra Part II.A.4.b.
100. See Taslitz, supra note 54, at 314-18, 330-40 (discussing the emotional reaction to being treated
as less worthy than others).
101. See TYLER & HUO, supra note 86, at 91, 162, 183, 202; Taslitz, supra note 51, at 1, 3, 14-30;
infra text accompanying notes 56-84.
102. See TYLER, supra note 89, at 50-57.
103. See Andrew E. Taslitz, What Feminism Has to Offer Evidence Law, 28 SW. U. L. REV. 171, 20409 (1999).
104. See Taslitz, supra note 54, at 373-76 (analyzing the importance of government’s conveying a
sense that each citizen belongs to the American people).
105. See RUBENFELD, supra note 35, at 153.
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Rubenfeld’s reference to the temporal nature of peoplehood can be understood
as meaning that a people are created in part by a narrative.106 Just as to be a
person is to be the combination of what you were, are, and will be, so is this
true of a people.107 To say that peoplehood is partly defined by a narrative is
not to render it a fiction.108 A person, in this view, is the story he tells himself
to link his memories, current experience, and aspirations.109 Likewise, a
people are defined by the story of their past, present, and future.110 Of course,
in a diverse nation, multiple and competing stories will abound. In what sense
can it, therefore, be said that a shared story unites Americans into one
people?111 The answer to this question lies in the second and, for my purposes
here, more important part of Rubenfeld’s definition of peoplehood—living
under the rule of a given legal and political order.112
The precise rules of such an order, of course, change over time. What
makes it the same legal and political order is a shared set of commitments.113
Here again an analogy to individual personhood is helpful. A commitment is
an enduring normative determination made in the past to govern the future.114
Commitments give purpose and direction to our lives. Each of us has
numerous commitments. Some are initially chosen, while others can at first
be imposed on us by circumstances, as happens when we are born into a
family.115 “To be a son, in the normative sense . . . is to be committed to
certain familial values, to find important aspects of my good in the life and
flourishing of this family, to recognize certain obligations to other members
of the family.”116
This son may, out of thoughtlessness or limited abilities, fail fully to
honor his commitments to his family. If they are still his commitments,
however, he will feel guilty about his failures and will try to do better next
time. But this last point reveals an unusual aspect of commitments: they must
be open to constant reflection and occasional change. Their normative force
stems from our sense that they are chosen, helping to define us. If we cannot

106. See JEROME BRUNER, MAKING STORIES: LAW, LITERATURE, LIFE 63-89 (2002) (discussing
narrative creation of the self); RUBENFELD, supra note 35, at 137 (discussing an analogy between individual
narrative of the self and group narrative of a people).
107. See RUBENFELD, supra note 35, at 137.
108. Id.
109. See id.
110. See id. at 148-59.
111. Cf. Andrew E. Taslitz, Hate Crimes, Free Speech, and the Contract of Mutual Indifference, 80
B.U. L. REV. 1283, 1316-28 (recounting differing interpretations of slavery’s meaning between the
antebellum and immediate post-Civil War South and North).
112. See RUBENFELD, supra note 35, at 153.
113. See id. at 154-58. Rubenfeld initially declares that he cannot precisely define “rule” under the
same order but then describes its characteristics as including the temporal extension of shared commitments.
See id. at 154-56.
114. See id. at 92.
115. See id. at 91-102.
116. R.A. DUFF, PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY 50 (2001).
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re-evaluate the wisdom of our commitments and accordingly change them,
they are no longer chosen, thus no longer ours.117 On the other hand, if our
commitments change too readily, they are no longer enduring, becoming
momentary preferences rather than commitments.118
To make a commitment does not mean to understand all that the
commitment entails.119 Our understanding of what our commitments require
necessarily changes over time.120 The son does not really know what it fully
means to be a son until he must care for an aging parent. Indeed that aspect
of sonhood may never have previously crossed the son’s mind.
A legal and political order consists of a people’s commitments. As with
the son, a people’s commitments must endure but may change, and as with the
son, what a people’s commitments require may only be realized over time.121
Diversity among individuals does not preclude this shared commitment.122
Commitments can be shared by people who radically disagree about the
meaning of the commitments in one circumstance versus another.123 If enough
individuals are prepared to live under institutions embodying shared legal and
political commitments, it is fair to consider them a people despite their
interpretive disagreements.124
Constitutionalism in a democracy is therefore a people’s struggle over
time to craft and live out its most fundamental commitments, even if the
commitments are contrary to the popular will at a given moment in time.125

117. See RUBENFELD, supra note 35, at 96-100.
118. See id.
119. See id. at 95.
120. See id. Rubenfeld writes that the committed person is “entrained in the task of working out the
implications and possibilities of certain engagements he already has with the world.” Id. at 95.
121. See id. at 54-58.
122. See id. at 156.
123. See id.
124. See id. This definition of peoplehood thus reconciles commonality with diversity. See id. at
158 (“To recognize a people as a subject persisting over time, despite the heterogeneity of its composition,
is ultimately no more mystical than recognizing individuals as subjects persisting over time despite the
heterogeneity of their composition.”).
125. See id. at 183-84; cf. DUFF, supra note 111, at 59, 69 (arguing that the “common law” is a
phrase best understood not as judge-made law but as law that “embodies the shared values and normative
understandings of the community,” meaning the shared commitments to certain political values); ROBIN
WEST, PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 1-40, 192-98
(1994) (arguing that history helps to inform us how we should constitute ourselves as a people today). In
an analogous argument, Professor George Fletcher argues that the Reconstruction Amendments embodied
a recognition that we had moved from being a loose collection of individuals at the founding to being an
“organic nation.” See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, OUR SECRET CONSTITUTION: HOW LINCOLN REDEFINED
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 57-74 (2001). Fletcher is inconsistent but seems to use the terms “people” and
“nation” interchangeably. See id. at 73. Rubenfeld would likely argue that we were always one people
whether we realize it or not because we are defined by who we are, were, and will be. See RUBENFELD,
supra note 35, at 56-73, 80-88, 158. Both scholars would agree, however, that our current sense of political
commitment requires exploring our past, particularly the changes wrought by slavery and Reconstruction.
FLETCHER, supra, at 73 (“[A] practice can be [sic] become part of the accumulated historical constitution
without this being the purpose of those who initiated the practice,” as Lincoln’s Gettysburg address has
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Understanding the meaning of a constitutional provision therefore requires
exploring both its relevant history and salient current social practices.126
Importantly, commitments derive from passion. Our most important
constitutional commitments indeed “tend to be enacted at times not of sober
rationality, but of high political feeling.”127 This passion is part of what unites
us over time. Commitmentarianism “captures the sometimes superior claim
of feeling over reason—of an enduring normative passion over day-to-day
rationality.”128
Furthermore, the members of a people, like the members of a family, owe
obligations to one another.129 These obligations arise from the people’s shared
commitments. The political-legal order helps both to express those
commitments and to encourage members to fulfill the obligations that they
accordingly owe each other.130
b. Exiled from the People
Because, under this conception, constitutional law is significantly what
defines us as a people, denying individuals their constitutional rights is in a
real sense marking them as outside of, or not fully part of, the people.131
Moreover, although living pursuant to the shared commitments embodied in
the constitution is what makes us part of the people, ignorance of those rights
would seem to affect the strength of the subjective sense of belonging to the
people.132 Such ignorance is, of course, widespread in America.133 So, if this

become “the preamble to a new order of nationhood, equality, and democracy.”); RUBENFELD, supra note
35, at 80, 199 (“In any particular nation, this we will have been the product of a history, a constitutional
struggle, usually waged at the cost of considerable blood and fortune,” as is illustrated by the paradigm case
of the struggle against the post-Civil War black codes.).
126. See RUBENFELD, supra note 35, at 56-73, 80-88, 158.
127. Id. at 129.
128. Id. at 94.
129. Cf. DUFF, supra note 111, at 46-48 (describing how members of a liberal political community
share obligations to one another, including the duty to respect and encourage diversity); ANDREW
KOPPELMAN, ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW & SOCIAL EQUALITY 70 (1996) (“Where stigma exists, there is
already community—and therefore communal obligations.”).
130. See supra note 115.
131. Cf. KARST, supra note 41 (making an analogous argument that denying constitutional rights
excludes certain groups from fully belonging to the American people).
132. Cf. TYLER & HUO, supra note 86, at 80, 91, 205-06 (noting that those identifying more closely
with society and its institutions, including its legal ones, put even greater emphasis on procedural justice and
that telling a person her rights and the reasons for police action is a marker of procedural justice that, in turn,
increases legitimacy and attachment to legal institutions and thus to willingness to obey the law in the long
run).
133. See, e.g., SCHUDSON, supra note 28, at 309-12 (arguing that any practical American conception
of citizenship must recognize most Americans’ ignorance about the details of many issues of the day); John
J. Patrick, Education on the Constitution, ERIC Identifier ED 285801, ERIC Clearinghouse for Social
Studies/Social Science Education, Bloomington, IN (1987), available at http://www.findarticles.com/p/
articles/mi_pric/is_198705/ai_4889488332/ (“[M]any Americans appear to be deficient in both knowledge
and appreciation of fundamental values, principles, and issues of their constitutional government.”).
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assertion is correct, many Americans may have less of an attachment to the
constitutional order than may be hoped.134 They may, in other words, have a
reduced sense of being part of a single American people; instead, they may
envision the nation as little more than divided factions, a country composed of
various interest groups jostling for power.135
Groups will, of course, necessarily struggle for power in a democracy, but
a weak sense of interconnectedness cannot bode well for resolution of those
struggles that enhance the common good, however defined.136 Just as national
identity implies a common narrative, so does each group’s and each
individual’s self-narrative about its membership and role in the broader people
help to define part of individual identity.137 Deluding individuals about the
existence and nature of the constitutional rights that help to define them as part
of the uniquely American people surely must exacerbate the sense among
those individuals of being less than fully connected to the nation.138
When ignorance combines with the misstatements, distractions, and
confusions that help to constitute political bullshit, this distortion of individual
narratives as Americans is magnified further still. Bullshit obfuscates clear

134. Cf. TYLER & HUO, supra note 86, at 174 (“[M]inority group members have less positive societal
orientations. Since societal orientations have an influence on decision acceptance, minority group members
have more negative relationships with legal authorities.”).
135. Andrew E. Taslitz, Interpretive Methods and the Federal Rules of Evidence: A Call for a
Politically Realistic Hermeneutics, 32 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 329, 355-56 (1995). This attitude is akin to that
of many public choice theorists who see legal and political institutions as dominated by “rent-seeking
groups” who “organize and try to ‘buy’ legislation, by promising to provide money, advertising, and the
votes of members to help re-elect a legislator.” Id. These groups act entirely in their own self-interest rather
than pursuant to a vision of the common good, and their success generally makes society as a whole worse.
See id. The most effective groups “can use threats, promises, and conditional cooperation to ensure that
members will act together for the good of the group.” Id. at 356. Some critical race theorists extend a
similar set of assumptions to the process of racial domination, arguing for the theory of “interest
convergence.” See, e.g., RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, MUST WE DEFEND NAZIS?: HATE SPEECH,
PORNOGRAPHY, AND THE NEW FIRST AMENDMENT 144-45 (1997) (summarizing the interest-convergence
theory). This theory holds that whites are, in general, more powerful than racial minority groups and work
to further primarily white self-interest, regardless of whether their motivations are conscious or not. See id.
The racial minorities’ lot improves, therefore, only when white and minority groups’ interests converge, that
is, when whites see helping blacks as serving white self-interest. See id. The argument here is that many
Americans routinely feel detached from the broader community, including its legal institutions, and this is
in part because they view that community as not acting in the interests of the detached—not caring for them
or seeing the necessity of even treating them fairly. See TYLER & HUO, supra note 86, at 52, 174 (analyzing
motive-based trust and community identification). Although minorities are more likely than whites to feel
less of a sense of identification with the broader community, African-Americans, as a whole,
overwhelmingly identify with other Americans while still strongly identifying with the African-American
community. See generally PAUL SNIDERMAN & THOMAS PIAZZA, BLACK PRIDE AND BLACK PREJUDICE 10956 (2002) (discussing the common ground among races).
136. See Taslitz, supra note 31, at 266-84 (arguing that appeals to racial solidarity, if properly done,
can motivate group political action, improve public debate, bring many whites on board, and build
minorities’ sense of investment in, and commitment to, societal institutions; however, errors in this area can
have the opposite effect).
137. See id. at 266-69; Taslitz, supra note 98, at 204-09 (discussing group-individual identity
connection).
138. See Taslitz, supra note 31, at 266-84.

2007]

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IMPLICATIONS

21

thinking by appealing more directly to emotions.139 Emotions stem in part
from beliefs. For example, if we believe that our next door neighbor is a serial
killer, we will fear him.140 Emotions also shape values.141 It seems right to
harm that which one fears, a form of self-defense.142 Educating Americans
about political states of affairs and about their abilities to exercise political
judgment also serves to enlighten, and thus to alter their emotions.143 How and
what emotions they experience affect their personal narratives, and their
personal stories affect what and how they feel.144 If one’s self-conception is
as brave, one may less readily feel fear upon rumors that his neighbors are
rowdy, even occasionally violent; the opposite is true if one sees oneself as
timid about physical or social conflict.145 By playing on one’s emotions,
political bullshit can thus alter how one views others as well as how one views
oneself.146 Ignorance makes it easier for bullshitters to manipulate people in
ways that they would resent were they more informed, a manipulation that can
add to social divisiveness.147
One philosopher sees politicians’ insistence that America is waging a war
on terror as illustrating this destructive use of political bullshit.148 Professor
Vanessa Neumann argues that the war terminology paints the world as a
“we”—the terrorized—and a “they”—the terrorists—who are in some
fundamental way different from us.149 Terror, explains Neumann, is an
emotion; thus, the phrase sets Americans on a war against an extreme kind of
fear, sparking a quest to identify the inhuman aliens who spawn this fear.150
The war on terror, Neumann argues, “is a bullshit phrase because it is a
narrative that evokes emotions, rather than the thought and discussion [that]
wise, democratic policy and military decisions require.”151

139. See Neumann, supra note 6, at 206-07.
140. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Two Concepts of the Emotions in Date Rape, 15 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 3,
9-12 (2000) (discussing the cognitive theory of emotions).
141. Neumann, supra note 6, at 209.
142. See id. at 211 (noting that the term “war on terror” teaches us “to fear some vague Other,
‘terror,’ and, by tapping into our deep-seated craving for security, urges us to hunt this bogeyman Other”).
143. See id. at 210 (noting that this effect can be either good or bad, but “the most dangerous of
political bullshit tries to educate our emotions by telling us what should make us proud or patriotic, angry
or frightened”); PETER GOLDIE, EMOTIONS: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLORATION 48 (2002) (noting that “the
emotions can be educated”).
144. See Neumann, supra note 6, at 208-10.
145. See Taslitz, supra note 135, at 9-12 (using other examples to make a similar point).
146. Neumann, supra note 6, at 210 (noting that bullshit “tells us what we should consider our civic
duty, what we should covet and—ultimately—who we are with respect to those around us”).
147. See id. (noting that bullshit “tries to make us desire and long for things we had not previously
considered”); supra Part I.B (discussing bullshit and manipulation).
148. See Neumann, supra note 6, at 210-12.
149. See id.
150. See id. at 211.
151. Id.; see generally STEARNS, supra note 33, at 21-56 (analyzing the depth and widespread
persistence of Americans’ fears after September 11, the state’s complicity in exacerbating those fears, and
the policy implications).
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The phrase thus illustrates how political bullshit degrades people in dual
fashion. First, it “seeks to shape our values in a manner that circumvents our
treasured human faculty to be moved by ideas. It appeals to our emotions and
avoids engaging those faculties of reason and debate that make us human.”152
Second, it relies on an almost irresistible appeal to our baser, rather than
our more ennobling impulses.153 It gives people a sense of group identity
based on a narrative not their own, creating a false connection to some people
—the favored group; the connection is false because it is based on untruths and
misdirection rather than on an accurate and reasoned understanding of the real
state of affairs.154 Neumann’s point in her example is not that the war on terror
is or is not wise policy but that the phrase and its attendant emotional appeals
and distortions of individual and group identity contribute to fuzzy thinking
by individuals, groups, and the polity as a whole concerning the wisdom of
terrorism-related policies while also promoting social divisiveness.155 In short,
the phrase helps to mold individual, group, and national identity in ways other
than by reasoned choice.156
This whole discussion may seem far removed from the setting of a police
officer seeking to search or interrogate without advising the suspect of his
rights. But events that happen in these settings are micro versions of the setting
in which appeals are made to the war on terror. The officer seeks, for
example, to play one suspect off against another so that the suspect will
identify more with the officer as savior than the rat-fink, coconspirator who,
the suspect is led to believe, has turned on the suspect.157 Moreover, the
officer not only refrains from advising the suspect of his rights but also seeks
to distract his attention from them by emotional game playing, attempting to

152. Neumann, supra note 6, at 212.
153. See id. at 210 (“The special problem with bullshit, however, is that it gets its power by appealing
to and motivating that part of us that is base and non-rational.”).
154. See id. at 212.
155. See id. at 212-13; infra Part II.C (discussing bullshit and social divisiveness).
156. See Neumann, supra note 6, at 212-13.
157. See, e.g., WELSH WHITE, MIRANDA’S WANING PROTECTIONS: POLICE INTERROGATION
PRACTICES AFTER DICKERSON 25-33 (2004) (summarizing modern interrogation techniques); YESCHKE,
supra note 40, at xi, 141-61 (summarizing techniques as part of an interrogation training manual that
purportedly counsels against outright lies, bluffing, or threats of force, yet concludes that interrogators
avoiding duress or coercion and treating subjects with compassion respects human dignity, even though they
“may use trickery and deceit to attain their confession”); Richard A. Leo, The Third Degree and the Origins
of Psychological Interrogation in the United States, in INTERROGATIONS, CONFESSIONS, AND ENTRAPMENT
37, 71-78 (G. Daniel Lassiter ed., 2004) (summarizing some modern interrogation techniques). Yeschke
also declares that “[i]t is unreasonable to give culpable subjects a sporting chance during interrogations,”
a statement that assumes police’s pre-interrogation ability to identify the culpable accurately, minimizing
the likelihood of police errors and of false confessions. Id. at xi. But see AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
ACHIEVING JUSTICE: FREEING THE INNOCENT, CONVICTING THE GUILTY: THE REPORT OF THE ABA
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION’S AD HOC COMMITTEE TO ENSURE THE INTEGRITY OF THE CRIMINAL PROCESS
xv-xxix, 11-22 (2006) (challenging these assumptions of police accuracy and of vanishingly small
percentages of false confessions).
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elicit fear, anger, sadness, or whatever else makes the suspect comply.158 If the
ideal democratic citizen is one informed of and ready to exercise his rights, the
officer seeks to degrade the suspect-citizen into an ignoramus and a puppet.159
If many officers do this, and if they do this most often to members of a
particular racial or similar group, they mark that group as outside the set of
shared constitutional commitments that citizens unbowed by governmental
aggression are ready to exercise.160
The emphasis in this section of the Article has been on the ways that
political bullshit harms and insults individual rationality and individual and
group identity while fracturing the polity. But them-us thinking, weakened
citizen character, muddled deliberation, and the other mechanisms by which
political bullshit degrades and divides can impose other social harms as well,
which need further elaboration. The next section turns to just such elaboration,
beginning with political deliberation.
B. Skewing Public Political Deliberation
Bullshit can injure and degrade not only individual rationality but also
that of the political system as a whole. Political scientists have so thoroughly
embraced the “deliberative turn”—the idea that a system of political
communication of publicly stated reasons for proposed collective outcomes is
what defines a democracy—that few alternatives have influence in that field.161
The theory of political deliberation was not originally rooted in the democratic
impulse, but rather in the idea that the “best men” should reason together
toward wise decisions.162 For deliberation to be democratic, it must be
inclusive, using an expansive definition of who is part of the process, that is,
of who has the right to deliberate—or at least a voice in choosing the
deliberators—and of who is included in the group to which the deliberators
owe their justifications.163 The debates among modern deliberative democrats
largely concern what conditions are necessary to maximize the democratic
nature of deliberation and its other social benefits.164

158. See WHITE, supra note 152, at 34-36, 76-101 (cataloguing ways that interrogators avoid the
Miranda warnings or minimize the impact of the warnings on the suspect).
159. See id.
160. Cf. Andrew E. Taslitz, Wrongly Accused: Is Race a Factor in Convicting the Innocent?, 4 OHIO
ST. J. CRIM. L. 121, 132-33 (2006) (suggesting a social and cognitive process that makes the risk of
convicting the innocent fall disproportionately on racial minorities, a process involving social stigmatization
and illustrated by flawed interrogation practices).
161. See JOHN S. DRYZEK, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND BEYOND: LIBERALS, CRITICS,
CONTESTATIONS 1-2 (2000); AMY GUTTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, WHY DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY?
3-4 (2004).
162. See GUTTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 156, at 8-9.
163. See id. at 9.
164. Compare DRYZEK, supra note 156, at 3 (arguing for a “discursive deliberation” more aggressive
in empowering dissenters), with GUTTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 156, at 3-13 (arguing for a form of
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One such condition that few dispute is that there must be an adequate
flow of information to citizens capable of using it.165 That condition is not
sufficient to ensure rational debate and scrutiny, but it is necessary.166
According to philosopher Mark Evans, this assumption is seriously flawed.167
Says Evans,
[E]lectoral democracy has to resist acknowledgment of this truth: in both its
theory and practice it assumes a degree of political competence on the part
of the citizenry—in the ideal of the ‘well-informed’ citizen—that it does not
(indeed cannot reasonably be expected) to possess. Citizens are effectively
encouraged, indeed they often feel themselves obligated qua citizens, to
formulate what often turn out to be incorrect, over-simplified or otherwise
flawed views on a whole range of issues without a concern for these failings
being properly accommodated in either the mindset or the institutional
embodiment of democratic deliberation.168

Evans sees three major responses, all of them inadequate, to this reality of the
uninformed citizen—elitism, relativism, or bullshit.169 Democratic elitists see
citizen ignorance as a primary justification for letting an informed political
class rule the polity’s day-to-day affairs.170 The elitists insist that their views
are still democratic because the people can check abusive rulers by periodic
elections.171 To allow too much citizen input into governance means dumbingdown political culture in a way that will lead to serious error.172 The broad
citizenry simply cannot widely share those qualities of character necessary for
avoiding mediocrity or worse in political debate and choice.173

deliberative democracy less rooted in critical theory).
165. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Eyewitness Identification, Democratic Deliberation, and the Politics of
Science, 4 CARDOZO PUB. L., POL’Y, & ETHICS J. 271, 284-93 (2006) [hereinafter Democratic Deliberation]
(noting that error correction and other benefits of public deliberation help to ensure the flow of a wide
variety of information to decisionmakers); Andrew E. Taslitz, Temporal Adversarialism, Criminal Justice,
and the Rehnquist Court: The Sluggish Life of Political Factfinding, 94 GEO. L.J. 1589, 1610-18 (2006)
[hereinafter Political Factfinding].
166. See GUTTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 156, at 3-7 (discussing necessary versus sufficient
conditions for quality public deliberation); Taslitz, Democratic Deliberation, supra note 160, at 284-95,
310-15 (discussing three “temporal prerequisites” to sound deliberation and the cognitive dangers posed by
poorly designed deliberative mechanisms).
167. See Evans, supra note 11, at 192-93.
168. Id.; see also FRANKFURT, supra note 2, at 63 (suggesting that democracy is particularly prone
to bullshit production because it fosters “the widespread conviction that it is the responsibility of a citizen
in a democracy to have opinions about everything, or at least everything that pertains to the conduct of his
country’s affairs”).
169. See Evans, supra note 11 at 195-97.
170. See id. at 195.
171. See id.
172. See id. at 196.
173. See id.
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Yet the elitist response seems radically inconsistent with theories of
inclusive democratic deliberation, with, in Evans’s words, “the principle of
equal respect for citizens, on which democracy is founded” and with the
“dumbed-up self-images of the age.”174 Indeed, worries Evans, a relativist
view often prevails in reaction to elitism, a view in which “equal respect”
means treating all views as equally valid, no matter how ignorant or how free
they are from the critical scrutiny and give-and-take, the common-goodcenteredness, that sound deliberation requires.175 This relativism certainly
eschews the exclusivity of elitism, but it does so at the cost of replacing
rational public conversation with massive confusion—the rule of a confused
hoi-polloi.176 This relativist turn is the elitist’s nightmare in which
“overwhelmed and embarrassed by the complexities of politics, perhaps
jealous of those few who seem more capable of getting to grips with them, the
ordinary citizen . . . reacts by stubbornly refusing the possibility of . . .
qualitative distinctions in political knowledge.”177 Thus, do “timid little
people” drag us all down?178
Yet Evans suggests that the elitist explanation is wrong.179 Most citizens
do not, at least openly, embrace a vision in which there are no objective
standards for judging the content and quality of civic discourse.180 People
recognize that individuals can and do speak political nonsense. But most
citizens convince themselves that they know enough to make sound choices,
though others may not.181 Citizens are not so much timidly fleeing from
subjective to qualitative standards for public debate as they are aggressively,
but falsely, insisting that they meet these standards.182 At some level, they
174. Id. at 195, 197.
175. Id. at 196.
176. See id.
177. Id. at 197.
178. Id. A well-known popularization of the whole idea of elitism and of its implications for selfgovernment that provides a useful context for further exploring Evans’s arguments, and a work worthy in
its own right, is WILLIAM A. HENRY, IN DEFENSE OF ELITISM (1995).
179. See Evans, supra note 11, at 191-92.
180. See id. at 192. Evans notes:
The partisan belief that it is obviously only ‘the other side’ that bullshits is itself bullshit. . . .
[N]ot all citizens are political cynics, or are as cynical as they like to think themselves to be.
Many of them buy into the bullshit of their politicians in their own ‘understanding’ of the
political world and doubtless do their own bit to embellish and propagate it.
Id. at 191-92. Evans’s position about whether most people believe at least that their own involvement in
deliberation is well-informed. is in fact more ambiguous than this Article presents it to be. His tone,
however, suggests that he does not truly believe that most Americans are consciously unabashed relativists
about how to judge the quality of civic discourse. In any event, even if this Article interprets Evans
incorrectly on this point, this author’s own study of the human capacity for self-deception leads to the belief
that political actors will be likely to attribute more objective fairness to their own attitudes and behavior than
might seem to be the case in the eyes of their observers. See Taslitz, supra note 26, at 394-98, 413-23
(discussing self-deception and its cognitive processes); Andrew E. Taslitz, Racial Profiling, Terrorism, and
Time, 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 1181, 1181-96 (2005) (discussing the actor-observer bias).
181. See id. at 191-92.
182. See id. at 197.
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know otherwise, but they prefer to live with this self-deceit. In short, the
people bullshit themselves about themselves.
Simultaneously, and significantly, says Evans, politicians spew bullshit.183
They do so because they know of citizens’ ignorance of reality, resulting, in
a practiced inability to handle the truth if it hits them in the head.184 Needing
a message understandable to the many, yet also needing to build diverse
constituencies into a united coalition, politicians pander to this account while
in fact hiding the truth and enabling an appeal to a diverse group.185 Evans’s
solution, therefore, is to burst each of our bubbles, by calling “bullshit!” on a
massive scale, recognizing a civic emergency caused by infectious
ignorance.186 If citizens can achieve high levels of political expertise, Evans
insists, they can do far better than they do now.187 Civic education must thus
be invigorated to deepen political knowledge and sharpen critical acumen.188
The media likewise must do a better job of exposing citizens to serious
debate.189 The persistent goal must be, explains Evans, for people “to learn
more of the Socratic skills of self-examination: to recognize how their own
views may be imperfect, and how one may go about refining them.”190
Evans’s entreaties are noble ones, and this Article explores their value
and practicality shortly. But Evans is wrong to condemn the current state of
affairs quite so harshly, for there is a fourth way to understand the modern
American polity, namely as one embracing the monitorial, rather than the
informed, citizen ideal.
The monitorial citizen ideal recognizes that modern life has become
increasingly complex, thus increasingly specialized.191 The ordinary citizen
cannot, therefore, reasonably be expected to fully track or understand events
in the stock market, foreign affairs, racial, gender, or other group-based
discrimination, the decline of unions, global warming, growing economic
concentration of certain industries, and the myriad other matters of concern
that bombard us in daily media reports.192 A specialized citizenry is the only
practical modern conception.193
Furthermore, alongside the original idea of the informed citizen, the
rights-bearing citizen has grown.194 Citizens need not wait for elections to be

183. See Evans, supra note 11, at 187-92.
184. See id.
185. See id. at 193.
186. See id. at 199-200. Using the philosopher’s tone, Evans describes his approach as fostering “an
anti-bullshit discursive culture.” Id. at 200.
187. See id.
188. See id.
189. See id. at 195, 200-02.
190. Id. at 200.
191. See SCHUDSON, supra note 28, at 310.
192. See id.
193. See id. at 310-13.
194. See id. at 309.
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active in their roles as citizens, nor need they limit between-election activities
to calls and letters to representatives or the occasional random call to jury
service.195 They can turn to courts and administrative agencies, and do so on
a daily basis, for recognition and enforcement of a generous notion of their
rights.196 Citizens have different rights in their different roles, locations, and
activities.197 Rights govern what happens in schools, the workplace, the home,
the environment, higher education, the professions, and the political process.198
Rights permeate our private and public activities. Rights affect businesses,
families, lovers, children, the elderly, and the ill.199 Talk of rights suffuses all
our relationships and conduct.200 At its worst, rights-consciousness promotes
isolation, selfishness, and conflict.201 At its best, it promotes responsibility and
community.202 But for better or worse, rights-consciousness helps constitute
our sense of self and society.203
Rights-consciousness and the accessibility of courthouse and
administrative agency doors have widely expanded the opportunities for civic
participation because our everyday lives are deeply politicized.204 Citizen
participation now exists in the “microprocesses of social life.”205 Americans
are citizens in our homes, schools, and places of employment. Furthermore,
Women and minorities self-consciously do politics just by turning up, so long
as they turn up in positions of authority and responsibility in institutions
where women and minorities were once rarely seen. They do politics when
they walk into a room, anyone’s moral equals, and expect to be treated
accordingly. The gay and lesbian couples in Hawaii in 1991 or in Vermont
in 1997 are political when they try to be legally married . . . . Others do
politics when they wear a “Thank You For Not Smoking” button or when
they teach their children to read nutritional labeling at the supermarket or
when they join in class action suits against producers of silicone breast
implants, Dalkon shields, or asbestos insulation.206

195. See id.
196. See id. at 240-74, 300-09 (defining, defending, and tracing the rise of the “rights-bearing
citizen”).
197. See id.
198. See id.
199. See id.
200. See id. at 240-74, 299-309.
201. See id. at 287-92. See generally MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT
OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE (1991) (describing the limits of our rights-obsessed society).
202. See generally SAMUEL WALKER, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RIGHTS AND COMMUNITY IN
MODERN AMERICA (1998) (discussing the impact of rights-consciousness in America).
203. See id. at vii.
204. See SCHUDSON, supra note 28, at 298-301.
205. See id. at 298.
206. Id. at 299.
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At the same time, history teaches us that a democracy needs a certain
level of distrust of its institutions by its citizens.207 “Because of distrust, we
have a Bill of Rights; because of distrust, we have checks and balances;
because of distrust, we are enjoined as citizens to be watchful.”208
In a complex world requiring some degree of distrust of institutions,
specialization, and widespread citizen participation in the personal as well as
the political realm, the informed citizen must be thought of as, in Michael
Schudson’s words, the “monitorial citizen.”209 Monitorial citizens do not
expect to be fully informed about the issues of the day.210 Rather, they scan
their environment, read newspapers, watch television, listen to radio or the
sermons of the clergy, and observe discord and injustices facing them in their
everyday lives.211 When they spot matters of grave concern to them, they read
more and talk more about those subjects.212 When their interests, needs, and
abilities demand, they act in those specialized aspects of their lives in which
they can have the most impact.213 A housewife or husband who is an active
PTA participant works to improve schooling; a lawyer does pro bono work for
the poor; a fishing enthusiast works for environmental causes; and a rape
victim counsels the sexually abused.214
In such a world, those accused of criminal activity have a special role to
play as monitors of police abuse. Their incentive to challenge abuses—
avoiding the stigma of criminal conviction and the resulting loss of liberty—is
high. Moreover, because they were abused, they have knowledge of individual
abuses that others lack. Furthermore, because even the indigent are
constitutionally entitled to counsel, they have a special expertise, through their
lawyers, to uncover official wrongdoing.215 The suppression motion and the
general public nature of suppression hearings enable them to challenge police
misconduct in a very visible fashion.216 When accusations of police abuses are
credible and serious, information revealed at suppression hearings will make
its way into the press.217 After police officers obtain warrants, warrant

207. Id. at 301.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 310.
210. See id.
211. See id.
212. See id.
213. See id. at 310-14 (elaborating on, and defending, the idea of the monitorial citizen and its
connection to increasing citizen specialization).
214. See id. at 311-14.
215. See TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note 18, at 666 (explaining the right to counsel and the role of
lawyers in the criminal justice process).
216. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 510-14 (2d ed. 1992)
(describing how suppression motions work); RAY SURETTE, MEDIA, CRIME, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
IMAGES AND REALITIES 103 (2d ed. 1998) (stating that suppression hearings are ordinarily open to the
public).
217. See SURETTE, supra note 212, at 64. This Article is not suggesting that the news media always
accurately report police behavior. To the contrary, police control over much information about their own
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affidavits come to light, and thus police know when applying for warrants to
state credible reasons for their requested search or seizure that are persuasive
enough to survive public scrutiny.218
In this monitorial vision of the citizenry, therefore, no individual citizen
can fairly be expected to be fully informed about every topic. But citizens
with strong motivations to assert their rights in specialized areas do need to be
informed about the content of their rights and when and how to exercise them.
Furthermore, they must be given the tools to make them effective monitors of
governmental abuses.
In the area of criminal justice and police behavior, criminal defendants
have an incentive to understand and exercise their rights. A first step in that
direction must, of course, be awareness of their rights. But, given the
increasing complexity of the law, suspects’ choices can never even come close
to being fully informed without the advice of counsel.219 Nor can individuals
subjected to police dominance expect that they alone can be effective monitors
of police wrongdoing.220 Once again, they need their lawyers to make
monitoring effective.221 Additionally, when there are abuses, lawyers can play
a role in bringing public attention to the abuses.222 With the assistance of the
media, they can act as “social T-cells” to alert the wider citizenry of political
infections requiring the body politic to mount an immune response.223
Awareness of the right to counsel thus becomes especially important.
Furthermore, because suspect awareness of his rights is a minimally necessary
condition for him to serve a monitorial role, a right to awareness of rights is

behavior and reporters’ desire to have a steady police source of news about crime combine to establish
selective media coverage of police abuses. See id. Nevertheless, the worst police abuses, especially tales
of police crime and corruption, are often reported. See id. Moreover, in suppression hearings, the parties
and the courts, not only the police, have some control over information about police behavior. See id. at 6064. These independent sources of information about police misconduct will be dramatically strengthened
if criminal discovery is significantly expanded. Cf. Laurie L. Levenson, The Future of State and Federal
Civil Rights Prosecutions: The Lessons of the Rodney King Trial, 41 UCLA L. REV. 509, 515-25 (1994)
(describing dismissal of criminal charges against Rodney King after the media broadcast of a private
citizen’s videotape showing the police beating King).
218. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-54 (1950) (noting that a search warrant affidavit ordinarily
“shall at all times be subject to inspection by the public”). The reasons come to light, of course, in the
suppression hearing and in the press. Laurence D. Finder, Searched, Seized, Aggrieved, 31 HOUS. L. REV.
24, 26-27 (1994) (noting search warrant affidavits in federal court and not under seal are available from the
trial clerk’s office).
219. See Political Factfinding, supra note 160, at 1591, 1594-97, 1615-18 (discussing the central role
of counsel as the citizen’s voice in any criminal proceeding).
220. See id.
221. Cf. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469-74 (1966) (creating a Fifth Amendment right to a
lawyer during custodial interrogation—a right nowhere recited in that Amendment’s constitutional text but
deemed by the Court necessary to effectively protect the privilege against self-incrimination in the
interrogation context).
222. See Political Factfinding, supra note 160, at 1591, 1594-97, 1615-18.
223. See Taslitz, supra note 31, at 288-90 (explaining the idea of social T-cells in a different context);
Political Factfinding, supra note 160, at 1591, 1594-97, 1615-18 (discussing, albeit using other terminology,
the social T-cell-like function of counsel).
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necessary so that the lawyer can challenge police efforts to obscure the content
and meaning of other rights from these citizens.224 When rights are provided
but in circumstances that unduly discourage their being understood or
exercised, lawyers can also challenge such obfuscation.225 If the judiciary
embraces a generous vision of the necessary understanding of rights that
suspects must have, police again have fewer incentives to distort citizens’
comprehension of their rights.226 Criminal suspects thus, when teamed with
their lawyer, can serve as an informed and monitorial citizen promoting real
respect for constitutional rights.227
Evans is, therefore, wrong to bemoan citizen ignorance as spelling the
death knell of deliberative democracy. An informed criminal suspect,
conjoined with competent counsel, can do the job for other citizens, educating
and alerting citizens to further action where necessary.
C. Them-Us Thinking
This Article argued earlier that bullshitting citizens about their rights
promotes societal balkanization by fostering them-us thinking. But them-us
thinking imposes additional costs as well: decreasing citizens’ acceptance of
police decisions and citizens’ willingness to comply with the law in the future,
subjecting some citizens to caste-based thinking, and increasing the risk of
error, that is, of convicting the innocent. All these costs in turn magnify the
problem of balkanization.
Remember that fitting or respectful treatment has two components:
treating each person as unique and yet simultaneously treating him as an equal
and valued member of a larger group, a person worthy of equal belonging. If
rights-consciousness is, as Part II.B has explained, a central component of
modern American identity, then the police failure to inform and explain
constitutional rights to any citizen may at least be one indicator that he is not
treated as a full member of the broader American community. If such failures
disproportionately affect members of some racial and ethnic groups more than
others, then rights-distortion or rights-veiling behaviors will mark members of
that group as strangers or, at least, as less-than-full members of the national
community.228 There is little doubt that policing generally, and thus police
bullshitting about rights specifically, affects African-Americans and Hispanics

224. See Political Factfinding, supra note 160, at 1591, 1594-97, 1615-18.
225. See id.
226. See id.
227. See id.
228. See, e.g., GLENN C. LOURY, THE ANATOMY OF RACIAL EQUALITY 61-65 (2002) (arguing that
racial profiling is both prompted by, and contributes to, racial stigma); TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note 18, at
443-45 (intentional racial profiling, though hard to prove, constitutes a denial of equal protection under
current United States Supreme Court precedents).
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more than whites.229 There is still less doubt that these racial minorities
perceive such differences.230 Such perceptions stem from a wide variety of
causes—personal experiences, vicarious experiences heard from others abused
by the police, parental teachings, a history of poor community-police relations,
and media images of policing.231 These factors seem to be magnified in
economically disadvantaged neighborhoods and among young males.232 The
expectations created by these factors also affect the lens through which police
conduct is viewed.233 A single bad experience with the police is seen as
confirming negative expectations.234 A single good experience is viewed as an
exception.235 Only a pattern of positive experiences are likely to contribute
significantly to altering racial group attitudes toward policing.236
Two major consequences flow from these realities and expectations. First,
denial of procedural justice—the sense of being treated fairly in
decisionmaking processes—under these circumstances can mark minority
group members as belonging to a lower caste.237 As used herein, caste means
a social status that offers inherent psychic rewards or penalties (depending
upon whether your caste is high or low) and that affects the distribution of

229. See, e.g., U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, POLICE PRACTICES AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN NEW
YORK CITY (2000), http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/nypolice/ch5.htm. The Commission summarized this state
of affairs thus:
Although th[e] permissible use of race as an identifying characteristic [sometimes] serves as a
necessary and efficient means for police to narrow their investigative efforts, police often lower
their standards of investigation when a suspect has been described as a minority, thus intruding
upon a greater number of individuals who meet the racial description than if the suspect had been
described as white.
Id. (quoting Developments in the Law—Race and the Criminal Process, Section III: Racial Discrimination
on the Beat: Extending the Racial Critique to Police Conduct, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1472, 1505 (1988)).
230. See, e.g., Tracy Maclin, “Black and Blue Encounters”—Some Preliminary Thoughts About
Fourth Amendment Seizures: Should Race Matter?, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 243, 255 (1991) (“[P]olice
encounters involving black men contain a combination of fear, distrust, anger and coercion that make these
encounters unique and always potentially explosive.”).
231. See RONALD WEITZER & STEVEN A. TUCH, RACE AND POLICING IN AMERICA: CONFLICT AND
REFORM 18-19 (2006). Professor Katheryn Russell-Brown similarly notes:
The fact that Blackness is perceived as a threat to Whites as a group and to police officers as a
group has paved the way for policing strategies that target and sanction potential minority
offenders. In turn, these strategies support police practices that treat Blacks as representative of
society’s deviance. This creates a dynamic relationship in which many Blacks are suspicious
and fearful of the police and many Whites and law enforcement officials are fearful of African
Americans. Malcolm Holmes describes the resulting relationship as a “climate of mutual threat.”
KATHERYN RUSSELL-BROWN, UNDERGROUND CODES: RACE, CRIME, AND RELATED FIRES 67 (2004)
(citation omitted).
232. See TYLER & HUO, supra note 86, at 146-48.
233. See id. at 141-48.
234. See id.
235. See id.
236. See WEITZER & TUCH, supra note 229, at 18-19. But see TYLER & HUO, supra note 86, at 133
(“But single experiences do influence . . . views [of the police], and that influence seems striking, especially
with legitimacy: 30 percent of the variance in the overall index of legitimacy is linked to judgments about
one’s recent personal experience.”).
237. See William E. Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1, 7-15 (1999).
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group access to material and other scarce social resources.238 To the extent that
such a caste system exists, it contradicts the ideal of equal belongingness rights
for all members of the political community.239 Yet whites, blacks, and
Hispanics alike probably understand the denial of procedural justice by the
police as just such a caste-marker.240
The broader public probably has mixed feelings about this situation. On
the one hand, the caste system seems to unsettle notions of equality at the core
of the modern mythology of American democracy.241 On the other hand, many
(especially white) Americans see criminals as a dangerous class to be feared
and suppressed.242 At least at a subconscious level, race and class are often
associated with criminality.243 Furthermore, generally high levels of trust in
the police among whites may lead to a de facto presumption that those whom
the police investigate are likely in fact criminals.244 On this view, many whites

238. See ROBERT J. COTTROL, ET AL., BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION: CASTE, CULTURE, AND THE
CONSTITUTION (2003). “It was a caste system that could allow quite intimate contact when a black person’s
inferior status was unquestionable and yet preclude it when there might be even a hint that members of
different races were meeting as equals.” Id. at 9. “Yet we use the term [“caste”] because it captures the rigid
and separate nature of the distinctions that were imposed or attempted [by slavery and Jim Crow].” Id. See
generally Clark D. Cunningham, Race, Class, Caste . . . ? Rethinking Affirmative Action, 97 MICH. L. REV.
1296, 1296-98 (1999) (discussing how caste systems, including in America, alter the distribution of psychic
and material resources among higher and lower-caste groups).
239. See Forbath, supra note 237 at 7-15 (1999) (surveying leading theories on caste and belonging).
240. See, e.g., Taslitz, supra note 155, at 126-30 (describing a process by which black citizens’
expectations of rights-denial by the police leads to such citizens’ hostile reactions to police stops or
interrogations, a hostility viewed by the police as indicative of guilty, thus prompting ever-more-aggressive
police tactics).
241. See, e.g., KARST, supra note 41, at 1-15, 43-62 (discussing Reconstruction-era constitutional
amendments and the American commitment to equality); ANDREW E. TASLITZ, RAPE AND THE CULTURE OF
THE COURTROOM 37 (1999) (arguing that racism skeptics, while accepting the wisdom of the aspiration
toward racial equality, maintain that as an empirical matter “individual racism is on the decline”). “What
racism does persist is either so socially unacceptable as to manifest itself subtly and covertly or is
institutional, the result of social processes that make it difficult to end racial disparities long after we have
abandoned racial hatreds and stereotypes.” Id.
242. See, e.g., MICHAEL TONRY, THINKING ABOUT CRIME: SENSE AND SENSIBILITY IN AMERICAN
PENAL CULTURE 1-19, 59-61 (2004) (discussing how moral panics coinciding with cycles of intolerance of
deviance gave harsh criminal justice policies emotional force, rendering the public susceptible to appeals
for repressive laws unconnected to the reality of the crime problem’s scope). A senior U.S. Justice
Department official told criminologists Norval Morris and Michael Tonry, “People are either for victims
or for criminals and . . . you’re for criminals.” Id. at 137. See generally JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING
THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A
CULTURE OF FEAR 1-12 (2007) (describing the historical process by which politicians were able to redefine
the ordinary citizen as a crime victim to be protected from the criminal predator class, leading to a style of
governing daily life in schools, families, workplaces, and residential communities through appeals to fear
of crime and criminals).
243. See, e.g., MICHAEL K. BROWN ET AL., WHITE-WASHING RACE: THE MYTH OF A COLOR-BLIND
SOCIETY 138, 153-60 (2003) (analyzing the interaction of race and class on crime rates and public
perceptions of crime); Human Rights Watch, Race and Drug Law Enforcement in the State of Georgia 20
(1996) (“Contemporary racism in public institutions is often subtle, diffuse, and systemic, and less likely
to be the result of the conscious prejudices of individual actors.”).
244. See, e.g., Ronald Weitzer & Steven Tuch, Race, Class, and Perceptions of Discrimination by
the Police, 45 CRIME & DELINQ. 494, 498-99 (1999) (finding that 65.8% of blacks in this study had only
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may arguably see police reading and explaining rights to suspects as giving the
guilty unfair tools with which to hide their wrongdoing. Suppressing evidence
where police do not provide rights thus seems to allow evildoers to benefit
from a technicality, leaving them free to prey on the rest of us yet again.245
Rephrased, there is reason to suspect that many whites see some persons (the
“innocent”) as deserving of their rights and others (the “guilty”) as not so
deserving.246 To the extent that presumed criminality is at least subconsciously
linked to race, entire racial groups—at least class and geographic subsets
thereof— become undeserving of rights notification and thus, constitute lessthan-equal citizens to the larger group of the supposedly righteous among us.
Indeed, evidence exists that whites often consciously embrace principles of
racial equality but subconsciously reject them when faced with a particular
racially-tinged situation.247
Second, apart from caste concerns, minorities’, like majorities’,
perceptions of the denial of procedural justice affect the perceived legitimacy
of police actions and the willingness to obey the law in the future.248 Yet,
especially in high-crime, economically disadvantaged areas, racial minorities

some, little, or no confidence that their local police would treat blacks and whites equally; approximately
five times as many blacks as whites reported experiencing mistreatment at the hands of the police; and a
similar proportion believed that police racism was common); Steven A. Tuch & Ronald Weitzer, Racial
Differences in Attitudes Toward the Police, 61 PUB. OPINION Q. 642, 642 (1997) (“African Americans [are]
more likely than whites to express unfavorable attitudes toward various aspects of policing”).
245. See KRISTIAN WILLIAMS, OUR ENEMIES IN BLUE 102 (2004) (arguing that racial profiling “helps
to align White people with the power structure by convincing them that the state protects them from people
of color”); ANDREW E. TASLITZ, RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: A HISTORY OF SEARCH AND
SEIZURE, 1789-1868 (2006) (discussing the public’s “mere technicality” understanding of the Fourth
Amendment).
246. See WILLIAMS, supra note 243, at 102-03 (arguing that modern public disorder is viewed as a
problem of the lower classes, which are today linked in the public mind to race, resulting in
disproportionately more resources going to combat black relative to white crime); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Race
and Capital Punishment, in AMERICA’S DEATH PENALTY: BEYOND REPAIR? 121, 137 (Stephen P. Garvey
ed., 2003) (“[E]vidence of good character [is] less likely to be credited because jurors attribute fewer
positive traits to people of color; the majority group sees African Americans as less intelligent, less hardworking, less patriotic–less good . . . than white Americans.”); Karen F. Parker et al., Racial Bias and the
Conviction of the Innocent, in WRONGLY CONVICTED: PERSPECTIVES ON FAILED JUSTICE 114, 121 (Saundra
D. Westervelt & John A. Humphrey eds., 2001) (“In the minds of many whites, people of color are more
likely to conform to a criminal stereotype and hence may be at risk of being arrested and convicted on
weaker evidence than whites are.”); cf. DONALD A. DRIPPS, ABOUT GUILT AND INNOCENCE: THE ORIGINS,
DEVELOPMENT, AND FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE xiv (2003) (suggesting that
constitutional criminal procedure doctrine must be drastically altered because current doctrine is “not
punishing enough of the guilty, [or] exonerating enough of the innocent . . . ”).
247. See LU-IN WANG, DISCRIMINATION BY DEFAULT: HOW RACISM BECOMES ROUTINE 17, 36-44
(2006) (explaining how situational factors can elicit unconscious racism, particularly in situations in which
the actor can consciously blame his choices on readily available non-racist justifications); see also sources
cited supra note 244 (describing presumed criminality linked to race and class).
248. See TYLER & HUO, supra note 86, at 153-64 (noting that the degree of the procedural justice
effects can vary among minority racial and ethnic groups in subtle ways and under a variety of
circumstances).
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perceive police as both under protecting the neighborhood and over-denying
its residents procedural justice.249
Regarding unwarranted stops-and-frisks, for example, blacks in
economically impoverished, high-crime neighborhoods are significantly more
likely than whites to see such stops as common.250 Blacks are also more
inclined than whites to perceive racial disparities in their treatment by the
police.251 Much of blacks’ and, to a lesser extent, Hispanics’ dissatisfaction
with the police stems not so much from disliking the outcome of the encounter
(e.g., arrested or not) as rejecting the fairness of the procedures by which it
came about.252 Accordingly, they are less willing to defer to police decisions
and less likely to trust police motives than whites.253
Interestingly, the caste and procedural fairness impacts may be
interrelated.254 Social science research suggests that the more people closely
identify themselves with the broader society, the greater impact procedural
justice has in promoting their willingness to obey the law and their sense of its
legitimacy.255 Furthermore, close identification with one’s racial or ethnic
group does not mitigate this effect.256 On the other hand, those who feel
detached from the broader society—a detachment that caste-oppression
amplifies—are less responsive in the short run to the benefits of procedural
justice.257 In the long run, however, reduced caste prejudice should mean
greater attachment of previously opposed groups to the broader society.
Greater attachment returns these groups to the same level of procedural justice
as those groups who always fully belonged.258 Yet, provision of procedural
justice further enhances the sense of belonging to the whole.259

249. See TASLITZ, supra note 243, at 9 (“Minority communities yearn for a police force that promotes
community safety while valuing community rights.”); TYLER & HUO, supra note 86, at 142-43, 162-63
(noting racial minority incentives in high-crime areas both to avoid police intervention in their lives and to
seek police protection); Alexandra Natapoff, Underenforcement, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1715, 1726-27
(2006).
250. See WEITZER & TUCH, supra note 229, at 64 (discussing how experience, neighborhood crime,
and media exposure all increase blacks’ and Hispanics’ greater beliefs, relative to whites, that police use of
unwarranted stops is widespread, and blacks in neighborhoods of “concentrated disadvantage” are also for
that reason alone more likely than others to mistrust police behavior, while, among whites, primarily only
those whites personally victimized by such behavior share this mistrust).
251. See id. at 88 (“On almost every issue, blacks are much more inclined than whites to perceive
racial disparities in policing, to disapprove of the disparities, and to say that they have personally
experienced discriminatory treatment.”).
252. See TYLER & HUO, supra note 86, at 158.
253. See id. at 151.
254. See id. at 127.
255. See id.
256. See id. at 173-74.
257. See id. at 207; YUEN J. HUO & TOM R. TYLER, HOW DIFFERENT ETHNIC GROUPS REACT TO
LEGAL AUTHORITY viii-ix, 62-64 (2000).
258. See TYLER & HUO, supra note 86.
259. See id. at 126-28, 208-08.

2007]

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IMPLICATIONS

35

In other words, making members of racial groups feel more like they
belong equally to American society makes them respond more favorably to
receiving procedural justice. Yet procedural justice consistently applied to
many group members over time makes them feel more like fully belonging
equals. The benefits of procedural justice in enhancing legitimacy, obedience
to law, commitment to American ideals, and de facto equality should thus be
reinforcing, particularly in the long run.260
Furthermore, blacks, whites, and Hispanics all consider the same sorts of
factors as contributing to procedural justice, though there may be some
differences in emphasis. All groups agree, at least at the principal level, that
rights provision and explanation are crucial components of procedural justice,
both generally and in the criminal justice system more specifically.261
Thus, in one national poll “94 percent of Americans thought that officers
should be required to inform persons they arrest of their constitutional
rights.”262 In another poll, 86 percent of Americans approved of the Court’s
Dickerson decision affirming the Miranda rule.263 One major national social
science study likewise found that roughly 91 percent of whites, blacks, and
Hispanics endorsed Miranda, with the majority in each group doing so
strongly.264
More broadly, in this same study—one of the most recent and most wellrespected in the field of racial minority-police perceptions—about 90 percent
of each of these groups thought it important for police to explain the reason for
any stop.265 Indeed, the growing social science consensus is that citizens are
more likely to be satisfied if officers treat them courteously and fairly and if

260. See id. at 126-28, 208-08; HUO & TYLER, supra note 256, at 63. Huo and Tyler note:
Our findings suggest that the public debate should focus on engendering stronger attachments
to American society rather than on the detrimental effects of strong ethnic identities. Authorities
are best able to carry out their roles when community members feel that they share a common
identity as members of American society. The large majority of respondents identified highly
with their ethnic group and American society. Part of the fears associated with the rise of
multiculturalism stems from the assumption that loyalty to America and loyalty to one’s ethnic
group are negatively correlated. Much recent research in the behavioral sciences and our own
findings support a different conclusion . . . people can be bicultural—attached to American
society and to their ethnic groups at the same time. Moreover, people who adopt a bicultural
orientation are as focused on the importance of fair treatment as are people who adopt a
traditional assimilation orientation. The fear should lie in the consequences of disidentification
with American society rather than strong identification with an ethnic group.
HUO & TYLER, supra note 256, at 63-64.
261. See TYLER & HUO, supra note 86, at 70, 80, 162, 207; HUO & TYLER, supra note 256, at viii-ix.
262. WEITZER & TUCH, supra note 229, at 144-45 (citing Gallup/CNN/USA Today poll, June 22-25,
2000, Lexis-Nexis Public Opinion Online).
263. Id. (citing National poll conducted for Newsweek by Princeton Survey Research Associates,
fielded June 29-30, 2000, Lexis-Nexis Public Opinion Online); see Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428
(2000); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
264. See WEITZER & TUCH, supra note 229, at 144.
265. Id.
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officers explain their rights and the reasons for police actions.266 This
satisfaction likely stems from several features of procedural justice: giving
citizens the information they need to understand and evaluate police actions,
thus relatedly allowing them to state their case and to contribute to the
correction of error; treating citizens honestly and equally; judging them with
good motives; respecting their rights; and treating them with politeness and
dignity.267
One final cost worth briefly noting is the cost imposed upon the
innocent.268 If police’s bullshitting minority citizens about their rights
contributes to them-us thinking, it should amplify such thinking among the
police themselves.269 Consciously or subconsciously, police may tend to see
young, male blacks or Hispanics as more likely than others to be criminals and
dangerous ones at that.270 Correspondingly, minorities treated disrespectfully
are more likely to react to such encounters with irritation, surliness, or even
anger.271 But these reactions tend to convince police that the suspect is hiding
something, thus more likely guilty.272 Accordingly, the police increase the
aggressiveness of their tactics.273 In the best case scenario, a young black male
innocent of any wrongdoing is subjected to an abusive, humiliating stop,
resulting in no evidence of a crime, so he eventually is allowed to walk away.
But he walks away with his distrust of the police confirmed.274 In the worst
case scenario, increasingly aggressive police tactics bear rotten fruit, causing
an innocent person to confess, one friend to falsely accuse another, and police
minds to close too early to alternative theories of who committed the crime.275
This exploration of procedural justice lays the groundwork for answering
a related, yet very different, question: If giving citizens their rights in an
effective manner generally improves obedience to the law overall—an
assessment that includes the behavior of the majority of persons, namely those
innocent of any substantial wrongdoing—will giving such rights improve, or
at least not worsen, the compliance of the guilty to police requests or demands
in individual cases? If the answer to this question is no—that rights provision

266. Id.
267. See id. at 129; TYLER & HUO, supra note 86, at 159, 183.
268. See generally Taslitz, supra note 155 (analyzing race and wrongful convictions).
269. See id. at 126-30.
270. See id.
271. See id. at 130-35.
272. See id. at 129 n. 26, 131-33.
273. See id. at 131-32; WANG, supra note 246, at 73-81 (applying a similar analysis to explain
racially-skewed distribution of false confessions).
274. See TYLER & HUO, supra note 86, at 202 (discussing humiliation involved in seemingly racebiased stops and frisks).
275. See ROBERT M. BLOOM, RATTING: THE USE AND ABUSE OF INFORMANTS IN THE AMERICAN
JUSTICE SYSTEM (2002) (recounting a variety of stories in which police turn one friend or compatriot against
another); WANG, supra note 246, at 73-81 (discussing false confessions); Susan Bandes, Loyalty to One’s
Convictions: The Prosecutor and Tunnel Vision, 49 HOW. L.J. 475, 475 (2006).
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reduces compliance by the guilty—then rights warnings may impose a
substantial social cost—the increased probability that the guilty will escape
justice.
This seems to be the only serious argument against rights provisions, and
it is probably an argument that police embrace. Police often see their safety
and effectiveness as turning on their ability to dominate a citizen in an
encounter.276 Furthermore, an officer is usually “reluctant to reveal his reasons
for stopping people because he sees his cues as private knowledge which, if
it were generally known, would aid criminals and make his work even harder
than it is.”277 The next question to be examined, therefore, is this: What are the
costs of having truly informed citizens, or in short, are there benefits to
bullshit?
III. THE BENEFITS OF BULLSHIT
The worry that warning citizens of their constitutional rights will mean
more frequent exercises of those rights is a strange concern. It reflects the idea
that rights are dangerous things, at least if placed in the wrong hands.
Opposition to rights warnings vests in police officers the discretion to decide
who is worthy of rights exercise. If no one is worthy, then no one should
know their rights; thus, no one will exercise them. For practical purposes,
rights will cease to exist. If only the police can decide worthiness, then this
vests in them a degree of discretion that seems flatly inconsistent with the
Constitution’s distrust of unbridled governmental discretion embodied in Bill
of Rights’ criminal procedural protections like the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments.278 Of course, one can redescribe matters, saying, for example,
that all citizens have the right to refuse to consent to searches and to refuse to
speak to the police, but only some citizens have a right to know their rights.
This idea may seem less offensive, but it stills leaves police the power to
decide who should make knowing choices and who should make ignorant
ones. Nevertheless, all rights are subject to balancing against countervailing
concerns.279 If providing warnings will reduce compliance with police search
requests or efforts to obtain confessions, then that is a social cost that courts
undoubtedly will take into account in crafting doctrine.
276. See TYLER & HUO, supra note 86, at 12, 22, 24. Correspondingly, procedural justice
perceptions are higher when officers seek dominance in a less overt manner by appearing neutral and
benevolent and by offering “status recognition,” defined as “the authority’s regard for the individual as a
full member of the community.” See HUO & TYLER, supra note 256, at 56.
277. JONATHAN RUBENSTEIN, CITY POLICE 264 (1973); see also TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note 18,
at 2-3, 4-5 (arguing that controlling police discretion is a pervasive theme in the law of constitutional
criminal procedure rooted in Bill of Rights guarantees like those in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments);
WEITZER & TUCH, supra note 229, at 129 (characterizing Rubenstein’s 1973 comment as still apt today).
278. See TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note 18, at 2-3, 4-5.
279. See id. at 23-25, 169-76, 671-77, 737-40 (discussing the pervasive role of interest balancing on
constitutional criminal procedure, especially as illustrated in the Fourth and Fifth Amendment contexts).
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Yet ignorance of the content of rights does not seem to be the primary, or
even a particularly significant, reason why people comply with police requests.
This conclusion admittedly involves some normative judgments and taking
sides in some empirical debates. For example, there has long been a lively
debate about how many confessions police would have otherwise obtained but
instead lost because of Miranda warnings.280 But even the most generous
estimates put the confessions lost at a mere 3.8%.281 Miranda opponents
consider this a huge social cost, especially because in absolute numbers it
means, they maintain, that 107,000 confessions vanish each year.282 That this
is a true cost assumes that those who would have confessed, but did not, were
largely the guilty, a matter of some dispute, and Miranda supporters
persuasively argue that, “[f]or all practical purposes, Miranda’s empirically
detectable net damage to law enforcement is [in fact] zero.”283 Yet even if
Miranda’s critics are right, the flip side of the coin is that the vast majority of
Mirandized suspects waive their rights and agree to talk to the police.284 The
emerging scholarly consensus is that the percentage of confessions lost to
Miranda is far lower than the critics suggest.285 But even if the critics are
right, the numbers still favor the conclusion that the decision whether to
confess is impacted by a variety of factors with more explanatory force than

280. See, e.g., THE MIRANDA DEBATE: LAW, JUSTICE, AND POLICING 169-248 (1998) (collecting
these debates).
281. See Paul G. Cassell, Miranda’s Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment, in THE MIRANDA
DEBATE, supra note 279, at 175, 183.
282. See id. at 185.
283. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda’s Practical Effect: Substantial Benefits and Vanishingly
Small Costs, in THE MIRANDA DEBATE, supra note 279, at 191, 205. For a lively debate on the likely
numbers of false confessions induced in post-Miranda America, compare Paul G. Cassell, The Guilty and
the “Innocent”: An Examination of Alleged Cases of Wrongful Conviction from False Confessions, 22
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 523, 526 (1999), arguing that false confessions are not prevalent, with Richard
A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions: Deprivations of Liberty and
Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of Psychological Interrogation, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429, 430
(1998), asserting that false confessions are a significant problem in America. See also WHITE, supra note
152, at 6 (describing Cassell’s guiding principle as being the number of voluntary—as opposed to proven
true—confessions not obtained under Miranda that would have been obtained under the earlier due process
voluntariness test).
284. See id. at 76-101 (reviewing the various highly effective police techniques used to prevent or
circumvent Miranda rights invocation and the extraordinarily high percentage of suspects who waive
Miranda and then confess).
285. See id. at 99-101 (describing the overall cost in lost confessions due to Miranda as “quite small”
and the cost when effective techniques are used to prevent or circumvent Miranda rights invocations as
“negligible”); Schulhofer, supra note 282, at 192 (estimating the percentage of confessions lost to Miranda
as, “at most only 0.78 percent—a mere seventy-eight one-hundredths of 1 percent for the immediate postMiranda period, and most likely even less today”).
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whether police warned suspects of their right not to cooperate.286 This is true
even if the sample is limited to likely guilty suspects.287
There is far less data on consent searches and warnings.288 Yet the
available data similarly supports the conclusion that rights warnings do not
increase noncooperation with the police.289 Sociologist Illya Lichtenberg, for
example, in a study of the Maryland State Police and the Ohio State Highway
Patrol, found that 88.5% to 96.5% of those asked to consent to automobile
searches by police officers did so when no warnings were given.290 When the
police gave warnings, however, there was no substantial decrease in the
percentage of instances in which police consent-to-search requests were
granted.291 These statistics held across race, sex, and age.292 Lichtenberg
concluded from this data that “verbal warnings are an ineffective means of
encouraging citizens to exercise freely their constitutional rights.”293 On the
other hand, combining both the confessions data and the consent-to-search
data, Lichtenberg explains:
Finally, for those who still fear that verbal warnings will render our criminal
justice system ineffective and lead to marauding criminals on the street with
no means to control them, these findings suggest that such fears are
unfounded. The criminal justice system appears to operate quite effectively
with verbal warnings in place. Research suggests that verbal warnings do not
have any substantial impact on consent or confessions.294

Indeed, Lichtenberg found that 12.9% of those consenting to searches were
found to be in possession of illegal narcotics.295 They consented anyway.296

286. WHITE, supra note 152, at 100. For example, explains Professor White, “[t]here are
undoubtedly a core of suspects—professional criminals—who are not going to make statements under any
circumstances [so that] . . . the presence or absence of Miranda warnings makes no difference.” Id. On the
other hand, explains White, the vast majority of suspects outside this core can be induced to confess in a
fashion that probably does not violate Miranda even though these suspects have indeed been warned of their
rights. See id. at 76-101.
287. This is so because the various factors involved work for nearly all suspects outside the core of
professional criminals who will never confess. See supra note 285 and accompanying text.
288. Because the debate about the numbers of lost convictions of the guilty due to Miranda is both
an old and well-known one, this Article focuses more on the social and psychological forces leading to
consent searches, about which there has been much less discussion.
289. See Illya Lichtenberg, Miranda in Ohio: The Effects of Robinette on the “Voluntary” Waiver
of Fourth Amendment Rights, 44 HOW. L. J. 349, 364-65, 367-73 (2001).
290. See id.
291. See id.
292. See id. at 366-73; see also Illya Lichtenberg, Voluntary Consent or Obedience to Authority:
An Inquiry into the “Consensual” Police-Citizen Encounter (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Florida State
University) (on file with author) [hereinafter Lichtenberg, Voluntary Consent].
293. See Lichtenberg, supra note 288, at 374.
294. Id.
295. See Lichtenberg, Voluntary Consent, supra note 291, at 170.
296. See id.; Illya D. Lichtenberg & Alisa Smyth, Testing the Effectiveness of Consent Searches as
a Law Enforcement Tool, 14 JUST. PROF. 95, 100 (2001). But see Steven L. Chanenson, Get the Facts, Jack!
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What explains compliance in the face of warnings? One possible
explanation is simple fear of the police. Lichtenberg found in a survey of
some of those consenting to searches in Ohio (an admittedly small sample),
“consented to search for one primary reason: fear of reprisal if they refused.”297
Other scholars have relied on older research on compliance to conclude that,
at a minimum, suspects are likely to blindly obey authority, especially
uniformed authority.298 Thus, in the well-known experiments of Professor
Stanley Milgram, subjects purportedly involved in a study about learning
patterns’ relationship to negative reinforcement were willing to give
increasingly higher-voltage shocks to a “learner” when he made mistakes.299
This escalation in voltage continued upon the experimenter’s command,
despite the learner’s at first modest, then vigorous, and finally painfully
screaming, protests.300 As Professor Ric Simmons has pointed out, however,
Milgram’s experiments involved obedience to orders, not requests, and did not
turn on subjects’ ignorance about their legal rights or the authority figure’s
intentions.301
Scholars challenging the voluntariness of consent to search as illusory
have also relied on Professor Leonard Bickman’s experiments involving
authority figures wearing uniforms.302 The experimenter dressed as a civilian,
then a milkman, then a guard (police-type uniform but with no gun).303 In each
pose, the experimenter ordered passersby to do one of three things: pick up a
bag, give a dime to a person near a parking meter, or change locations.304
Compliance rates were much higher in the two uniformed than the one civilian
situation and were particularly high—89%—when the guard uniform was

Empirical Research and the Changing Constitutional Landscape of Consent Searches, 71 TENN. L. REV.
399, 455-59 (2004) (cautioning against some aspects of Lichtenberg’s work that may limit the conclusions
that can be drawn from it and recommending further research while acknowledging that Lichtenberg’s work
is the best done so far).
297. See Lichtenberg, Voluntary Consent, supra note 291, at 250-51. But see Dorothy K. Kageliro,
Perceived Voluntariness of Consent to Warrantless Police Searches, 18 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 38, 43
(1988) (only 6% of people in a survey said they consented because of fear of police).
298. See, e.g., Janice Nadler, No Need to Shout: Bus Sweeps and the Psychology of Coercion, 2002
SUP. CT. REV. 153, 175-77 (2002) (noting that, despite differences between Milgram’s work and consensual
bus sweeps, Milgram’s experiments supported the theory that the symbols of authority coerce people into
complying with police consent to search requests when they would rather refuse); Daniel Rotenberg, An
Essay on Consent(less) Police Searches, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 175, 187-89 (1991) (concluding that, despite
the riskiness of extending the logic of Milgram’s work to consent searches, nevertheless “police authority”
is the primary way to explain consent searches).
299. STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY: AN EXPERIMENTAL VIEW 16-22 (1974).
300. See id. at 20-24. Milgram engaged in a number of variations on this central experiment, but all
converge on the same conclusions summarized here. Id. at 60-61.
301. See Ric Simmons, Not “Voluntary” But Still Reasonable: A New Paradigm for Understanding
the Consent Searches Doctrine, 80 IND. L. J. 773, 807 (2005).
302. See Leonard Bickman, The Social Power of a Uniform, 4 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 47-51
(1974).
303. Id.
304. Id.
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worn.305 Again, as with Milgram’s experiments, orders, rather than requests,
were involved, and rights awareness versus rights ignorance was not tested,
making the experimental circumstances very different from those involved in
consent searches or in interrogations.306 Nevertheless, these studies suggest
that the reasons for citizen obedience to the police are far more complex than
fear or a knee-jerk obedience to authority, even if those forces do play some
role and perhaps under certain circumstances an important role.307
Research psychologist Tom Tyler recently conducted a series of studies
and a literature review of when and why Americans obey government agents,
including the police and the courts. Tyler found at least two important
psychological processes to be at work: a sense of personal responsibility to
defer to legitimate government authorities and a desire to empower
government to solve social problems, particularly in the face of a perceived
crisis.308
Concerning the sense of obligation to obey authorities, Tyler found that
82% of participants agreed that, in general, “[p]eople should obey the law even
if it goes against what they think is right” and, more specifically, that those
surveyed always try to follow the law even if they think that it is wrong.309
Almost as high a percentage agreed that “[d]isobeying the law is seldom
justified,” and 69% agreed that “[i]t is difficult to break the law and keep one’s
self-respect.”310 A full 84% of participants affirmed that “[i]f a person is doing
something and a police office tells them to stop, they should stop even if they
feel that what they are doing is legal.”311 These feelings of obligation to obey
the law were roughly the same among whites and African-Americans.312

305. See id. at 49-52; see also Marcy Strauss, Reconstructing Consent, 92 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 211, 238 (2002) (arguing that Bickman’s experiments show that uniforms have a compelling
effect on people); Adrian J. Barrio, Rethinking Schneckloth v. Bustamonte: Incorporating Obedience
Theory into the Supreme Court’s Conception of Voluntary Consent, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 215, 240 (1997).
306. See Simmons, supra note 300, at 808-10 (analyzing applicability of Bickman’s experiments to
the consent search situation); Brad J. Bushman, Perceived Symbols of Authority and Their Influence on
Compliance, 14. J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 501, 502-06 (1984) (conducting a later experiment confirming
many of Bickman’s results despite variations from Bickman’s original experiment).
307. See John R.P. French, Jr. & Bertram Raven, The Bases of Social Power, in STUDIES IN SOCIAL
POWER 150, 165 (Dorwin Cartwright ed., 1959) (breaking social power into six categories, including
coercive power—fostering the fear that disobedience will be punished); Thomas Blass, The Milgram
Paradigm After 35 Years: Some Things We Now Know About Obedience to Authority, 29 J. APPLIED SOC.
PSYCHOL. 955, 962 (1999) (finding the French and Raven system a helpful way to understand the obedience
to authority experiments); Simmons, supra note 300, at 811-17 (applying the French and Raven system to
consent searches).
308. See Tom R. Tyler, A Deference-Based Perspective on Duty: Empowering Government to Define
Duties to Oneself and to Others, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RIGHTS AND DUTIES: EMPIRICAL CONTRIBUTIONS
AND NORMATIVE COMMENTARIES 137, 137-41 (Norman J. Finkel & Fathali M. Moghaddam eds., 2005).
309. See id. at 141 Table 6.1 (citing survey results from TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW
45 (1990)).
310. See id.
311. Id.
312. Id. at 142.
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Moreover, other studies revealed that the sense of responsibility and obligation
to legitimate legal authorities does indeed affect behavior, not just expressed
attitudes, and influences people’s willingness to obey the law in their everyday
lives.313 In other words, Americans see obeying the law and legal authorities
as the right thing to do, a binding moral obligation and a matter of personal
responsibility that is independent of any fear of being caught or punished for
violations.314 Tyler concludes:
These findings suggest that people feel a considerable sense of personal
responsibility to curb personal freedoms when those freedoms conflict with
social rules. In this sense, Americans seem like a group of people who are
generally willing to restrict their personal freedom to act as they wish when
required to do so by social rules.315

Tyler also found Americans’ desire to empower government to solve
problems, thus mandating deference to governmental authorities, to stem in
part from free-rider concerns.316 If the government does not act, reliance on
volunteers will mean an unfair distribution of burdens, allowing nonvolunteers to reap unfair advantages.317 In the case of criminal justice, for
example, if only some people refrain from theft or assault but others do not,
then the non-compliers unfairly gain money and the psychic satisfaction of
wreaking physical vengeance on others.318 Supporting government’s ability
to enforce the criminal law equally (including by encouraging citizens to
refrain from violating it) and to punish free-riders—criminals—who take
advantage of other citizens’ compliance with the law gives the state more
resources with which to do its job. In other words, obeying the police and the
law is a way to free up resources for the government to track down and punish
the real, but hopefully now few, legal deviants.319
Correspondingly, individuals may be uncertain about the nature and
extent of some of their obligations to others. Compliance with legal authorities
eliminates difficult moral ambiguities about what to do. Such compliance also

313. See id.
314. See id. at 138.
315. Id. at 142.
316. See id. at 139-40; see also Michael Diamond & Aaron O’Toole, Leaders, Followers, and FreeRiders: The Community’s Dilemma When Representing Non-Democratic Client Organizations, 31
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 481, 505-06 (2004) (discussing the meaning of “free rider”).
317. See Tyler, supra note 307, at 139-40.
318. See id. This reasoning is analogous to that articulated by the debt-to-society retributivist
thinkers’ justification for criminal punishment. See ELLEN PODGOR ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW: CONCEPTS AND
PRACTICE 5-6 (2005).
319. Cf. BERNARD HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING, POLICING, AND PUNISHING IN AN
ACTUARIAL AGE 22-24 (2007) (arguing that in a world of limited resources, policing via racial profiling will
actually raise total crime in society as white crime rises upon police efforts shifting primarily to black
crime).
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frees individuals from fretting over how much to do.320 According to Tyler,
“If they follow the law, people are entitled to feel that they have ‘done their
duty’ and they are free to use their resources to pursue their own self-interest
(although, of course, they can give even more to others).”321
Tyler found this government empowerment motivation to be particularly
powerful in times of perceived crisis.322 This observation might suggest that
the more government is successful in fostering a sense of crisis in a particular
area of policing, the higher the citizen compliance rates will be. The
declaration of a “war on crime” can perhaps be understood in these terms: the
sense of crisis created by the mere declaration itself creates a more lawcompliant populace.323
Furthermore, Tyler’s study did not specifically examine police-citizen
interaction during crises but did explore the willingness of Americans to obey
United States Supreme Court interpretations of the Constitution on socially
divisive issues.324 Within certain broad limits, Americans were quite willing
to do so even when strongly disagreeing with the Court’s decisions.325 Again,
this willingness turned on the perceived legitimacy of these decisions.326 To
the extent that police are seen as implementing such decisions, Americans can
be expected to react similarly. Furthermore, Tyler sees the logic of his and
other researchers’ efforts in this area as extending well beyond the specific
situations being studied to an understanding of why Americans obey legal
authorities generally, and he has in related, though not identical, work
specifically examined attitudes and behavior toward the police.327
The important qualification to Tyler’s conclusions is their limitation to
instances where governmental action effectively dons the “mantle of
legitimacy.”328 Procedural justice is the most important factor in bestowing
that mantle.329 Such justice requires affected persons’ participation in the rulecrafting or implementing process.330 Additionally, “[t]he neutrality of decision
makers, the trustworthiness of their intentions, and their recognition of citizen
rights are all-important elements of procedural justice.”331
The willingness to obey the police from a sense of moral obligation to aid
and a desire to empower legitimate government actions seem like perfectly

320. See Tyler, supra note 307, at 140.
321. Id.
322. See id. at 149.
323. See SIMON, supra note 240, at 22-31 (discussing the war on crime and its role in creating a more
compliant population).
324. See Tyler, supra note 307, at 151-52.
325. See id. at 151-56.
326. See id.
327. See id.; see also TYLER & HUO, supra note 86; HUO & TYLER, supra note 256.
328. See Tyler, supra note 307, at 153.
329. See id.
330. See id.
331. Id. at 154.
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appropriate reasons for citizen compliance. Less appropriate reasons arguably
involve, however, a variety of means of governmental and situational
compulsion. One commentator has convincingly argued, however, that here
too rights warnings might play an important role.332 This commentator reaches
his conclusions by relying on sociologists J.R.P. French, Jr. and B. Raven’s
categories of social power which can be exercised in any situation in which
one individual exerts some influence over another.333 These six categories are
as follows:
1. Reward Power is exerted when the authority induces a belief in
the subject that his obedience will be rewarded.
2. Coercive Power is exerted when the authority induces a belief in
the subject that his non-compliance will result in his punishment.
3. Obligatory Power is exerted when the subject complies because
he believes that the authority has the legal or social right to
command obedience.
4. Referent Power is exerted when the subject complies because he
identifies with, and wishes to be like, the authority figure.
5. Expert Power is exerted when the subject complies from a belief
that the authority possesses specialized knowledge in the area in
which he issues a command.
6. Informational Poweris exerted when the subject complies because
new information given to him by the authority figure changes
the subject’s beliefs in a way that also alters his behavior.
Unlike the first five types of power, which are rooted in who the
authority figure is, this last type of power is rooted in the content
of the information he dispenses.334
Social psychologists have seen this scheme as helpful to understanding the
results of compliance experiments.335 Law Professor Ric Simmons, building
on the work of these social psychologists, argues that in the context of consent
searches some degree of compulsion is unavoidable.336 The question is how
much of each type of social power may the police use to obtain consent.337
Thus, argues Simmons, police exercise of referent power—citizens identifying
with and trusting the police—or of informational power—citizens complying
because they are persuaded by officers’ provision of new and accurate
information—is normatively desirable, for citizens then assist police because

332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.

See Simmons, supra note 300, at 811-12.
See id. (citing French & Raven, supra note 306, at 50-67).
See id.
See Blass, supra note 306, at 962.
See Simmons, supra note 300, at 811-15.
See id.
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they believe it is the right thing to do, perhaps concluding that they are aiding
in preventing or punishing crime.338 On the other hand, persuasion “based on
coercive or obligatory social power is inappropriate, though some amount of
it is no doubt unavoidable, and should be discouraged by the legal system.”339
“Obligatory power” in this context means that the subject bows to police
authority:
[B]ecause she perceives that the law enforcement officer has a legitimate
right to force her to consent. Because by definition the law enforcement
officer does not have such a right in the context of consent searches, the use
of obligatory social power is an abuse of the policeman’s authority; it
essentially tricks the subject into believing that the police officer has legal
power that he does not in fact possess.340

Rights warnings, Simmons further explains, help to reduce law enforcement’s
exercise of obligatory social power, the inaccurate belief that the subject is
legally compelled to comply, yet would do little, if any, harm.341 Indeed,
maintains Simmons, warnings might increase the officer’s desirable exercise
of referential or informational power.342 Thus, Simmons again writes,
As was the case with custodial interrogations, law enforcement officials
forced to give a notification will no doubt learn to rely on other techniques
to gain consent, and if the notification is properly given, it will be difficult for
these other techniques to rely upon obligatory social power. If the warning
has no effect in diminishing the use of obligatory social power, it is hard to
see how it would have any effect at all; in other words, requiring a
notification could not possibly do harm. The truth is probably somewhere in
the middle. For some subjects, the notifications will have absolutely no
effect; for others, it will completely eliminate the improper use of obligatory
social [power]; while for most, it will diminish, at least to some extent, the
improper use of that power and thus force police to rely upon other, more
acceptable forms of persuasion.343

Restated somewhat in the terms used in this Article, rights warnings will
not likely end the police bullshitting citizens. Warnings, however, will create
a real chance of at least somewhat reducing one kind of bullshit—the kind that
relies upon citizen rights ignorance to compel obedience. That form of bullshit
is particularly reprehensible for the reasons expressed in Parts I and II of this
Article. Yet ending it will likely impose little in the way of the social cost of

338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.

See id. at 817.
Id.
Id. at 816 (emphasis added).
See id. at 819.
See id.
Id. at 820.
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reducing consensual searches and confessions. Indeed, the available empirical
data, as well as psychological theory, suggest that the guilty as well as the
innocent will generally not be less compliant simply because they are made
aware of their rights.344 To be sure, many of the guilty will not consent to
searches or interrogations.345 Strong personalities, experience with the system,
self-interest, and criminal sophistication are more likely explanations for such
reticence, however, than rights awareness.346
It is an open question whether, without other forms of bullshit, any
consensual searches or voluntary confessions of the guilty would occur. If it
turns out to be true that few would occur, then the relative benefits and costs
of these alternative forms of bullshit must be weighed, as must their
seriousness and intensity. A bullshit-free world of policing may be
unattainable, perhaps undesirable. Nevertheless, forms of bullshit in which
rights warnings are given but in a hurried, garbled, or aggressive manner that
prevents them either from being understood or believed cuts too close to the
kind of disrespect for the person and the polity that the rights warnings
themselves are meant to avoid.347 Such rights-belittling forms of bullshit
should be discouraged absent strong evidence that their absence frees too
many of the guilty, and perhaps not even then. Rights warnings that are mere
forms of words are not meaningless, for their symbolism alone has value in
expressing respect.348 But warnings that are empty rituals will still do far less
in obtaining the positive benefits outlined here than will warnings of real
substance. Discouraging this more subtle form of police rights deception
likely requires remedies far beyond simply mandating the police mouthing of
the appropriate words. Videotaping the entire consent search and interrogation
processes, whenever practicable, is one example.349 The bottom line is that the
costs of the state bullshitting its citizens are rarely articulated with any

344. See supra text accompanying notes 277-331. In addition to the factors identified above,
Professor Nadler has argued that actor-observer bias (observers, including police officers, tend grossly to
overestimate the voluntariness of others’ actions), social validation from following the same course of action
chosen by others, politeness rules for expressing and understanding commands stated as requests in certain
social contexts, the coercive effect of narrowing personal space, deference to status, reduced deliberation
under time pressure, and a corresponding rise in stereotyped and scripted judgments and behaviors all may
contribute to citizen compliance with police “requests” to search. See Nadler, supra note 297, at 168-72,
179-97. Given these coercive factors, Nadler emphasizes the substantial social cost arising from the fact
that the “vast majority of people subjected to consent searches are innocent.” Id. at 208-213 (analyzing the
innocence problem and the risk that lasting widespread negative attitudes toward the police by the lawabiding may result); cf. Arnold H. Loewy, The Fourth Amendment as a Device for Protecting the Innocent,
81 MICH. L. REV. 1229, 1269-70 (1983) (arguing Fourth Amendment doctrine must consider the perspective
of and costs to the innocent).
345. See WHITE, supra note 152, at 100-01.
346. See id.
347. See id. at 79-99 (summarizing techniques to render Miranda warnings meaningless); supra Part
II.A.1 (discussing disrespect for the person).
348. See supra Part II.A.1.
349. See American Bar Association, supra note 152, at 11-22; THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT,
MANDATORY JUSTICE: THE DEATH PENALTY REVISITED 75-85 (2005).
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specificity, while the costs of prohibiting, or at least reducing, such bullshit are
too often simply assumed rather than proven. In practice, current law therefore
effectively and wrongly places the burden of justifying the reduction of police
bullshit on the defendant. At least concerning bullshit about rights, the burden
should be shifted back to where it belongs—the state. At the same time, some
humility about how much rights warnings can accomplish in promoting a
healthy citizenry is required. Achieving that goal requires action by a wide
array of institutions, such as the schools and the media, in addition to the
police. The final task that this Article seeks to accomplish is to elaborate
briefly upon this caution to be humble. Humility rests in understanding what
it means to be a good citizen.
IV. THE GOOD CITIZEN: CHARACTER AND IGNORANCE
The ideology of the informed citizen has deep roots in British and
colonial political thinking.350 This ideology viewed ignorance as opening the
way to tyranny.351 In the words of William Livingston, a mid-eighteenth
century New York author, “the Strength of a People . . . [has] always been the
Consequence[]f of the Improvement and Cultivation of their Minds.”352 But
this cultivation, said Livingston, served political purposes, for when men know
their rights, “they will at all Hazards defend them, as well against the insidious
Designs of domestic Politicians, as the undisguised Attacks of a foreign
Enemy . . . .”353 This strain of thought—that the minds of even the lower ranks
must play a prominent role in political thought—was then unconventional.354
350.

See RICHARD D. BROWN, THE STRENGTH OF A PEOPLE: THE IDEA OF AN INFORMED CITIZENRY
(1996). This discussion articulates an ideology, not whether in practice the people
were adequately informed. While the ideology has changed over time, not all have agreed about the meaning
and purpose of being informed, though “[f]or at least two centuries, Americans have believed in the idea
that citizens should be informed in order to be able to exercise their civic responsibilities wisely.” Id. at xiii.
Indeed, the ideology that was widely proclaimed by notable leaders at the republic’s birth quickly became
a central theme in American political life and by the Civil War era, “had grown into an article of national
faith.” Id. Here, the Article paints with a broad brush, emphasizing dominant themes that helped to define
this ideology without exploring all the variations on its meaning throughout history, a task already ably
performed by Professor Brown and one unnecessary for this Article. This discussion simply gives a sense
of the ideology’s meaning.
351. See id. at 1-84.
352. William Livingston et al., The Advantages of Education, with the Necessity of Instituting
Grammar Schools for the Instruction of Youth, Preparatory to Their Admission into Our Intended College,
in THE INDEPENDENT REFLECTOR; OR, WEEKLY ESSAYS ON SUNDRY IMPORTANT SUBJECTS MORE
PARTICULARLY ADAPTED TO THE PROVINCE OF NEW YORK 419 (Milton M. Klein ed., 1963).
353. Id. On the other hand, said Livingston, when men have been uninformed, “triumphant
Ignorance . . . [opens] its Sluices, and the Country . . . [overflows] with Tyranny, Barbarism, ecclesiastical
Domination, Superstition, Enthusiasm, corrupt Manners, and an irresistible confederate Host of Evils, to its
utter Ruin and Destruction.” Id. at 419-20.
354. See BROWN, supra note 349, at 39-40. The implicit assumption at the time, however, was that
women, African Americans, and Native Americans were excluded from the active political community and,
thus, not in need of being informed. See id. For white women, unlike African Americans and Native
Americans, there were possibilities in education, albeit ones focused on competing in the marriage market
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But the informed citizen ideology gained ground in the colonies between 1763
and 1775 when self-styled colonial gentlemen sought to resist a series of
British Parliamentary acts and administrative policies.355 These gentlemen
included planters, merchants, and almost everyone with a college degree, as
well as master tradesmen, like shipbuilders, printers, and iron masters.356
These gentlemen discovered that mobilizing broad-based opposition among
the citizenry by legislative resolutions, public meetings, newspapers, and
pamphlets was a powerful political tool in resisting royal administrations.357
But the intellectual elites among these gentlemen also saw theoretical
value in creating informed citizens, for “they would always know their rights
and not fall prey to the machinations of tyrants.”358 Before Independence,
John Adams and Thomas Paine were the leading exponents of this view.359
There is a long and fascinating history of the development of this
informed citizen ideology from the Revolutionary period onward that this
Article will not trace. Moreover, there were important differences among the
Founders and their intellectual progeny in emphasis and in understanding of
the purposes of fostering informed citizens.360 No point would be served by
recounting and critiquing those various views. Rather, this Article will focus
in particular on the views of one Founder—Thomas Jefferson. This is not
because I agree with all that Jefferson says on the subject but because
exploring aspects of his thinking in this area illustrates the narrow point sought
to be made here: just telling people their rights is not enough. They must truly
understand them, a feat requiring copious and continuing background
knowledge, and they must live their rights. These assertions stem from
recognizing that some knowledge is tacit, working at the subconscious level
in often rapid, even habitual fashion, and some knowledge is experiential.361
This last point is simple but important. Just as telling others how to ride a bike
does not mean they can do it—they also need practice—telling others their
rights does not mean they can inhabit them. Rights must be exercised or they
are mere words, without life. Moreover, such exercise both forms and reflects
the kind of strong, robust character needed if republican citizens are to

and on household management. See id. At the same time, the perceived ignorance of these groups was often
seen as justifying their exclusion from and subordination by the active political community. See id. at 4344.
355. See id. at 52-54.
356. See id.
357. See id.
358. Id. at 54.
359. See id. at 54-66.
360. See id.
361. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Exorcising Langdell’s Ghost: Structuring a Criminal Procedure
Casebook for How Lawyers Really Think, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 143, 168-70 (1991) (discussing tacit and
experiential knowledge in the legal profession); Taslitz, supra note 26, at 390-91 (analyzing the unconscious
nature of much human thought); see generally DONALD SCHON, THE REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONER (1989)
(discussing tacit and experiential knowledge in the professions generally).
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forestall tyrannies, both large and small. Civic education must be not merely
of the mind, but of the heart, the soul, and the character.
Jefferson, more than any other Founder, saw development of this “civic
virtue” as primarily a bottom-up affair, bubbling up from the people, though
the statesmen or “natural aristocracy” at the top also required additional sorts
of virtues.362 Civic virtue required “spiritedness,” which must be “‘woven into
the American character’ through education.”363 Only a properly educated
citizen body actively participating in local affairs will be capable of selecting
the “best men” to represent them.364
The great danger to a republic, said Jefferson, was lethargy among the
people, entailing “the death of public liberty.”365 Civic lethargy arises when
people no longer pay attention to public affairs, becoming too involved in their
private concerns.366 A lethargic people cannot guard against the tendency of
unwatched leaders to put their own self-interest above the people’s.367
Spiritedness is the cure for lethargy. Spiritedness, as one Jefferson scholar
describes it, requires “a jealous insistence on one’s rights . . . and a willingness
to resist . . . every encroachment, real or imagined, on these rights.”368
Spiritedness’s close cousin is occasional turbulence among the people, for
such turbulence “nourishes a general attention to the public affairs” and warns
rulers that “‘the people preserve the spirit of resistance’ to their
government.”369 Although this spirit might sometimes require armed resistance
in extreme circumstances, Jefferson, especially later in life, embraced less
radical forms of struggle through outspokenness, civic involvement, and
electoral combat.370
Spiritedness requires education to enable citizens to understand and
respectively exercise and fulfill their rights and duties.371 For the mass of the
people, at least several years of universal formal education is required, an
education including the expressly political purpose of encouraging the spirit
of resistance to governmental abuses of power and the judgment to elect

362.

See JEAN M. YARBROUGH, AMERICAN VIRTUES: THOMAS JEFFERSON ON THE CHARACTER OF
103 (1998).
363. Id. at 103.
364. See id. at 105.
365. Id. at 107.
366. See id.
367. See id.
368. Id. at 104, 114; see also ADRIENNE KOCH, JEFFERSON AND MADISON: THE GREAT
COLLABORATION 43 (1996) (“Indeed, it was a specifically Jeffersonian tenet that democracy would work
only to the extent that it activized the great mass of the people.”).
369. See KOCH, supra note 368, at 45 (“Jefferson, having weighed democratic turbulence against the
oppressions of monarchy, stoutly maintains that ‘it becomes nothing.’ He even hoped such events might
be productive of good in focusing attention on public affairs.”); YARBROUGH, supra note 362, at 114.
370. See YARBROUGH, supra note 362, at 115-25.
371. See id. at 125-26; GORDON S. WOOD, REVOLUTIONARY CHARACTERS: WHAT MADE THE
FOUNDERS DIFFERENT (2006) (“None of the other major founding fathers was as optimistic and confident
of the people as Jefferson was.”).
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virtuous representatives.372 Only such education to “illuminate, as far as is
practicable, the minds of the people” can ward off civic degeneracy.373
Accordingly, “[f]or Jefferson the first task of universal public education is not
job training or the encouragement of the artistic imagination and creativity, but
the formation of citizens who understand their rights and duties to themselves,
their neighbors, and their country.”374
Such understanding does not flow, however, from formal education alone.
Jefferson expected civic education to be a lifelong affair.375 Ordinary
Americans should be trained in a thirst for political knowledge, one quenched
only by continual reading of newspapers, purchases of books, and visits to
libraries.376 Good citizens need freedom to pursue happiness by their own
lights and the economic independence to resist the sway of demagogues.377
Politics and the quest for politically relevant knowledge must thus not
consume average citizens, but must nevertheless be an important part of their
lives.378
Maintaining this proper balance between the public and the private
required some mechanism to ensure active citizen involvement, at least at the

372. See YARBROUGH, supra note 362 at 125-26.
373. Id. at 125.
374. Id. at 127.
375. See id.
376. See id. at 127. Ordinary Americans in the early period of our nation’s history did, indeed, act
as if they were heeding Jefferson’s entreaties, with the number of newspapers and their active readership
blossoming, newspapers decidedly focused on the political issues of the day. See SUSAN DUNN, JEFFERSON’S
SECOND REVOLUTION: THE ELECTION OF 1800 AND THE TRIUMPH OF REPUBLICANISM 137-48 (2004).
377. See YARBROUGH, supra note 362, at 125-27 (noting that among the purposes of universal
education are supplying “the people with the knowledge of those subjects that will ensure their future
‘freedom and happiness’” and teaching them “the virtues of independence, industry, and self-reliance.”).
Historian Joyce Appleby saw Jefferson’s thinking on matters of citizen independence as rooted in aspects
of American reality:
The democratization of American society in the early nineteenth century is no exception [to the
rule that no one individual can be credited for momentous social changes]. From the beginning
of European settlement on the North American continent, it had been difficult to transplant
government authority, social formalities, and economic regulations. American men, just because
they had access to land, voted in larger numbers than anywhere else. The economic base of
family farms and owner-run plantations nurtured independent ways. American prosperity
promoted personal confidence and easy communication across class lines—the raw material for
participatory politics. To these foundations for a democratic society Jefferson added rhetorical
inspiration, political wisdom, and upper-class connections. As an insider, he saw the obstacles
that elite prejudices and pretensions placed in the way of democratic practices. A highly
ingenious leader, he was able to lay a route around them.
JOYCE APPLEBY, THOMAS JEFFERSON 4 (2003). Of course, Jefferson’s vision was blind to including women,
African Americans, and Native Americans, but that should be no bar to taking the best of Jefferson’s
informed, activist-citizen ideology to craft a more inclusive vision for today. See id. at 3-4. See generally
GARY HART, RESTORATION OF THE REPUBLIC: THE JEFFERSONIAN IDEAL IN 21ST-CENTURY AMERICA (2002)
(incorporating a book-length effort to craft just such a vision).
378. See YARBROUGH, supra note 362, at 102-03 (explaining that, for Jefferson, in a “liberal republic,
the most important virtues, both moral and intellectual, flourish outside the political arena,” yet virtue also
required citizen participation both in elections and in more direct means of involvement in government).
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local level.379 Only such involvement could properly continually educate the
people’s character in the way required by a sound republic.380 Jefferson’s
proposed mechanism was the creation of local wards below the level of the
counties.381 At this small, local level citizens would approach or achieve the
direct action and citizen involvement that a republic demands.382 Citizens
could manage for themselves a variety of tasks, including running schools,
organizing the militia, maintaining roads, and supervising the police.383 Each
ward “would thus be a small republic within itself, and each man in the State
would thus become an acting member of the common government, transacting
in person a great portion of . . . [his] rights and duties . . . .”384
Some measure of direct citizen involvement at the local level has many
benefits, fostering the habits of self-government and spiritedness required in
a republican people.385 Jefferson did believe that the best men, the natural
aristocracy, needed more formal education than the common man.
Universities would help to serve that function by educating these elites in law,
government, and republican principles and theories.386 Universities would thus
aid in raising republican statesmen, cultivating their virtue too, and educating
them in the skills and information needed to serve their public role.387 Yet
even such well-trained elites could not be trusted to be worthy representatives
if not monitored by a vigilant people.388 The wards would educate the people
in the republican virtues while enabling them to resist governmental
corruption.389 The wards would draw people out of their entirely private
concerns to public ones too.390 The mere act of local deliberation, even if selfinterested concerns motivated citizens to become politically involved in the
379. See id. at 133.
380. See id.
381. See id.
382. See id. at 133-34; HART, supra note 377, at 116 (“Thus, the ward republic is the means by which
classic republican virtue can be reconciled with the liberal value of nondomination by the state. Only
through direct citizen participation in the polis and control of local governmental affairs can individual
liberty be reconciled with civic duty.”).
383. See YARBROUGH, supra note 362, at 134.
384. Id. at 134. Jefferson said that “making every citizen an acting member of the government, and
in the offices nearest and most interesting to him” is central to the life of the free citizen. Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816) in 15 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 32-44
(Thomas Jefferson Memorial Association ed. 1907).
385. See YARBROUGH, supra note 362, at 135.
386. See id. at 137 (“Jefferson never imagines that the ‘debased’ passion for equality may lead the
people to try to tear down those who are naturally better. Conversely, Jefferson assumes that the natural
aristocracy is well disposed toward the people.”); id. at 141-44 (noting that, nevertheless, a proper university
education is necessary to train the best men in the knowledge and virtues required of republican statesmen).
387. See id. at 141-43.
388. See HART, supra note 377, at 116 (noting that, for Jefferson, “civic virtue and the duties of
citizenship are the best protectors of these rights.”); WOOD, supra note 371, at 108 (noting that Jefferson
“always thought that the people, if undisturbed by demagogues or Federalist monarchists, would eventually
set matters right”).
389. See YARBROUGH, supra note 362, at 135.
390. See id.
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first place, would teach them the habits of considering other people’s interests,
of putting themselves in their fellows’ places, and of seeing the connection
between self-interest and the common interest.391 These traits, in turn, would
better enable the people to spot local and national abuses and organize to resist
them.392 As Jefferson explained:
Where every man is a sharer in the direction of his ward-republic, or of some
of the higher ones, and feels that he is a participator in the government of
affairs, not merely at an election one day in the year, but every day; when
there shall not be a man in the State who will not be a member of some one
of its councils, great or small, he will let the heart be torn out of his body
sooner than his power be wrested from him by a Caesar or a Bonaparte.393

Jefferson’s logic, and even more clearly, the logic of modern
Jeffersonians like Gary Hart should extend to the little Caesars who aim to
subjugate individuals in their daily lives, including, for example, those police
more interested in conveying the “power image of the beat officer”394 than in
solving crimes and respecting rights-bearing citizens or, in the words of one
well-known commentator, in the “petit apartheid” of racial profiling and the
more subtle instances of racial “micro-aggressions”—insults—too often
occurring in street-policing.395 Perhaps these are modern illustrations of why
Jefferson saw universal public education and involvement in the wards as the
twin political “hooks” on which republicanism depends.396
The bottom line is a simple one: Police informing searchees and arrestees
of their rights serves important political goals at likely relatively little social
cost. But, despite these net benefits, telling people their constitutional rights

391. See id. at 138-41, 151-52.
392. See id. at 135-36 (defending this understanding of Jefferson’s views while conceding that he
unduly minimized the dangers of majority factions); see id. at 137 (“What worries Jefferson is that if the
people do not remain vigilant, if the link between the people and their representatives becomes too tenuous,
not even the most wise and virtuous can be trusted to remain faithful to their duty.”); see id. at 138 (noting
that the wards will train citizens in the habits needed for vigilant monitoring of the state); see id. at 139
(noting that encouraging resistance to government without debilitating it is a “tension [that] can also be
minimized by sustained political participation, the dissemination of information, and civic education, so that
the healthy distrust of political power contributes to responsible government”).
393. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Joseph C. Cabell (February 2, 1816) in 14 WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 384, at 417-23.
394. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 15 n.11 (1968).
395. See Katheryn K. Russell, Toward Developing a Theoretical Paradigm and Typology for Petit
Apartheid, in PETIT APARTHEID IN THE U.S. CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: THE DARK FIGURE OF RACISM 3,
3-13 (Dragan Milovanovic & Katheryn K. Russell eds., 2001) (defining, and explaining the significance of,
“petit apartheid”); Douglas E. Thompkins, The Presence and Effect of Micro/Macro-aggressions and Petit
Apartheid, in PETIT APARTHEID IN THE U.S. CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: THE DARK FIGURE OF RACISM,
supra, at 21-26 (defining, and explaining the significance of “micro-aggressions”). See generally Hart,
supra note 377 at 196-226 (suggesting a variety of modern methods for realizing Jefferson’s goal of
individual and collective citizen nondomination by anti-republican forces, both large and small).
396. See YARBROUGH, supra note 362, at 133.
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in the occasional highly stressful encounter with the primary representatives
of the state authorized to use force (the police) cannot even begin properly to
educate the citizenry in its rights in any truly meaningful way. Far wider
social changes are required. Too much should not, therefore, be expected from
the rights warnings defended here. They are but a small piece in a much larger
and more complex political puzzle.
V. CONCLUSION
The idea of political bullshit clarifies the ways in which police efforts to
hide, minimize, or distort citizen information about constitutional rights
undermines respect for equal human worth and wounds the polity. Such
bullshit insults individuals and even entire racial or ethnic groups, fosters
social divisiveness, and damages public and private deliberation. Political
bullshit of this type also undermines the law’s legitimacy by reducing
procedural justice. Simultaneously, the costs of ending such bullshit by
providing rights warnings are likely small, for the vast majority of people will
still cooperate with police investigations. Those who will not cooperate
probably would not have done so without the warnings anyway. The balance
of social costs and benefits thus tips in favor of rights warnings. At the same
time, however, humility is required. Rights warnings will do something to
improve the health of our republic. But creating or maintaining an informed
vigilant people requires much, much more.

